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 The President of the United States has a variety of instruments at his disposal that 
he can utilize to advance his agenda, of which three of the most prolific are interest 
groups, the media, and party politics. This thesis examines the manner in which various 
Presidents have interacted with each of these instruments, how the relationships with 
these elements have played out, and what advantages and disadvantages exist as a result. 
The methodology used for this thesis analyzes a variety of scholarly theories and works, 
and applies any pertinent existing theories to particular actions by different Presidents. 
For interest groups, results showed that each leader discussed in that section 
acknowledged that interest groups are important resources for realizing a Presidential 
agenda, although each administration interacted with interest groups differently. In terms 
of the interaction with the media, using Presidents Roosevelt and Obama as case studies, 
it was discovered that the media is a very significant resource that can be used to both 
disseminate important information and enhance the image of the President, establishing 
his legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Thus, it is important for a President to be 
balanced and understand the significance of these instruments when trying to achieve 
success with their agendas. The final element of party politics, using Reagan and Bush, 
also resulted in mixed impacts based on the circumstances and appeal of a leader during a 
particular time. The overarching conclusion was that the relationship between the 
President and these instruments is highly complex and yields different results based on 
certain motivations and opportunities. 
Thesis Advisors: Dr. Dorothea Wolfson, Richard M. Skinner, Robert J. Guttman,  
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 In the wide world of policymaking, there are a plethora of instruments which can 
be used to influence how policy plays out in the political arena. Of these, the three most 
significant are interest groups, the media, and party politics. Whereas interest groups and 
the media are external factors which lobby and disseminate information to influence 
policy, party politics is internal. More specifically, it is important to examine the 
relationship these three factors share with the President of the United States and each of 
the advantages and disadvantages they provide. As he is the initiator of a specific policy 
agenda, and manager of the nation, one must analyze how these factors impact his role, 
what theories constitute the relationship the President may share with these factors, and 
how the impact of these factors have differed in various administrations. Understanding 
these, helps explain the scope, extent, and definition these truly have on the Presidency 
and describes how limited or strong his policymaking power plays out as a result. 
 In this thesis, in Chapter 1, I look at interest groups and how their relationship has 
played out with the President. I examine various scholarly theories, and then look at the 
Carter, Ford, Clinton, and Obama administrations. For my second chapter, I look at the 
media’s relationship with the President, various scholarly theories defining this 
relationship, and the way these played out in the administrations of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and Barack Obama. With Obama, I look at his campaign strategies and 
healthcare policy to explain how the media impacted them. For the third chapter, I look at 
the Reagan and Bush administrations to explain how party politics have played out in 
those regimes and what it has meant for that leader’s success. I also examine scholarly 




Chapter 1 - What's Your Interest?: A Look At the Presidential And Interest Group 
Relationship 
The Importance And Motivations Of The Interest Group-Presidential Relationship  
 Much has been said and debated about the complexity of our nation's policy 
making process. Within the policy making framework, one of the entities that wields the 
most power is that of the executive branch of government. The executive branch carries a 
plethora of agendas and policy ideas when approaching the challenges that the country 
faces and utilizes Congress as the tool that implements those policy ideas into law. 
However, when attempting to surge forward with policy, the Presidency, and also 
Congress, have to contend with a significant external, non-governmental player that can 
change the destiny of any policy agenda or piece of legislation—interest groups. Interest 
groups cater to a particular issue area that legislation may cover, and serve to either help 
promote it or oppose it with their lobbying resources. The role of interest groups in the 
policy arena today is best defined by author Richard Gable who states, “Private interest 
groups and administrative agencies have come to be the principal originators of policy, 
while legislative groups, along with administrative and private groups, are the major 
shapers of public policy,”
1
.  
Due to the prominence of an important external factor that impacts policy such as 
interest groups, one must examine how the policy making process by a particular branch 
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of government has evolved over time and how the relationship between that branch and 
this factor has manifested. Author Paul Light has stated that, “Whereas the President 
attempts to maintain contact with party leaders, there is a conscious effort to avoid 
interaction with most interest groups. Unless the interest group is a key member of the 
President’s electoral coalition, there is only limited contact,”
2
. For the purpose of this 
study, and keeping Paul Light's theory in mind, the focus will be on Presidential 
interaction with interest groups. In order to understand the scope of interest group impact 
on the Presidency, one has to recognize the importance of interest groups, what factors 
have contributed to the relationship the Presidency has with interest groups, how has this 
relationship impacted actions in specific administrations, what theorists have discovered 
on this relationship, and ultimately whether the current state of the relationship can be 
justified. As interest groups play a role in the policy making process, it is essential to 
examine the relationship the White House has shared with interest groups, its scope, and 
how that relationship has evolved and taken root in our political landscape. I do this 
through theoretical examination of approaches under the Carter, Ford, Clinton, and 
Obama administrations. Scholar John Kingdon has written extensively about the 
existence of interest groups in the public policy arena, including defining what 
circumstances enable them to establish liaisons with governmental institutions. Kingdon 
argues that interest groups operate in only a certain set of circumstances
3
. He states, 
“Generally, then, the lower the partisanship, ideological cast, and campaign visibility of 
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the issues in a policy domain, the greater the importance of interest groups,”
4
. Kingdon’s 
main point underlies the idea that if a certain policy issue is not visible on a campaign 
agenda, does not have a root in a particular ideology, or is not prominent along partisan 
lines, then this gives an interest group an incentive to work towards bringing that issue to 
the attention of policy making bodies. Kingdon's definition also implies that in order for 
an interest group to operate optimally to its goals or purpose, it has to work in an 
environment where ideology takes a backseat. This is a pertinent element to take note of 
as when the relationship between particular administrations and interest groups is 
examined, the role of partisanship will play a role in defining the way a relationship is 
played out. However, it is also important to note, that the motivations behind interest 
group action is not so simplistic. In other words, it is not exclusively the existence of the 
aforementioned scenarios that drive interest groups to establish active relationships in 
policy making. As John Kingdon writes regarding interest groups as policy entrepreneurs, 
“They could be…in interest groups…But their defining characteristic, much as in the 
case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness to invest their resources…in the hope 
of a future return,”
5
. This basic understanding denotes that in the definition of the 
relationship between interest groups and governmental institutions the most significant 
parameter and driving factor is the element of gain. 
 In a broad sense, when it comes to policy, the “element of gain” can serve as a 
greatly beneficial tool. Authors Andreas Dür and Dirk De Bièvre state regarding interest 
groups, “Their participation in policymaking may improve decision-making processes by 







supporting policies that are in line with citizen preferences and blocking policies that 
solely reflect the interests of the governing elite,”
6
. In other words, the interest group 
liaison with governmental entities can create mutual advantages for the two parties 
involved. On a basic level in terms of an advantage, Jeffrey Cohen outlines that one 
predominant way in which this relationship can help a President is that it can give him a 
new outlet of building support, or a coalition if you will, for a particular policy idea that 
might be stifled by certain other factors
7
.  Jeffrey Cohen states, “...as the parties have 
polarized and the media have fragmented...presidents have turned to other sources for 
support, like interest groups,”
8
. Similarly, interest groups can fulfill their mission of 
advancing the specific cause they represent by engagement in the policy arena. Author 
David Lowery states, “But when organizations face uphill battles that they are unlikely to 
win, purely instrumental lobbying may be necessary. If, for example, core interests are 
threatened, even slim chances of success may necessitate lobbying,”
9
. Active efforts by 
interest groups to promulgate their ideas, especially through building a partnership with 
an entity as powerful as the President, may also better allow them to fulfill both the 
policy and professional objectives that they have with an extra push. As Dür and De 
Bièvre state on interest group influence, “The opposite case is a situation in which a 
group's attempts at influence are countered by lobbying efforts of other groups, public 
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opinion, and political parties,”
10
. By liaising with a strong governmental entity, interest 
groups can develop a buffer against other entities which may be attempting to stifle the 
necessary policy goals that need to be achieved. Another potential tool that can build the 
relationship between interest groups and governmental entities involves that of campaign 
contribution, identified as a factor to consider on interest group influence by Richard A. 
Smith
11
. An interest group can contribute money to a Presidential campaign, thus creating 
the opportunity for a mutual gain. The President can benefit from receiving monetary 
funds in his campaign, whereas the interest group has a chance of establishing itself in the 
“good books” of the President. Richard A. Smith, within the context of Congress, 
dismisses the actual advantage contributions hold by stating, “...it is difficult to measure 
the quantity and quality of the access that members of Congress actually grant lobbyists, 
studies rarely provide direct, quantitative evidence of the relationship between interest 
group campaign contributions and patterns of access granted,”
12
.  However, in another 
study, David Austen-Smith states: 
“Insofar as concern over the impact of campaign contributions on policy reflects 
the possibility that such contributions distort the available electoral choices, the 
results here suggest that this concern has some justification. In the case in which 
no funds would be forthcoming were contributions allowed, permitting them has 
no effect on policy positions. In all other cases the impact on policy relative to 
what it would have been is unambiguously to push both candidates in a direction 
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favorable to one (ordinarily, the larger) donor. In particular, in contrast to the 
intuition that explicit exchange models suggest, campaign contributions do not 
induce a more sharply distinguished choice for the electorate by driving 
candidates further apart and toward the extremes of the issue space (Peltzman, 
1976, p. 215; Chamberlin, 1978),”
13
. 
Based on the study by David Austen-Smith in contrast to the absolutist statement by 
Richard A. Smith, the situation type can impact whether campaign contributions have 
been instruments of persuasion or not. Thus, the potential impact of campaign 
contributions cannot be overlooked when looking at the interest group-President 
relationship. These are some of the core advantages within the context of “gain” that can 
come to an interest group-Presidential relationship. It can provide not only a better flow 
in policy creation fulfilling policy objectives, but governmental entities like the President 
can appeal to their voter base and expand the power of their stature.  
  In terms of a more practical advantage of the interest group-Presidency 
relationship stems from the ability of the former to organize the policy making spectrum 
into coherence. Kingdon writes, “Cohesion is another resource that gives a group some 
advantage in affecting the governmental agenda,”
14
. The ability for an interest group to 
pool together its resources and organize strategy for policy, aides any governmental 
branch with its hopeful trajectory for a policy item. However Kingdon also enumerates 
that it’s important to note that this particular element albeit important, cannot be 
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generalized into the assumption that interest groups are always able to benefit a policy 
agenda
15
. Kingdon goes on to state that, “One cohesion problem involves potential 
differences between leaders and followers...an impressive resource base does not 
necessarily insure that the group will dominate discussion of issues relevant to its 
interests, or get its way,”
16
. Therefore, a massive risk that can occur with interest group 
involvement is the reverse effect—rather than bringing groups together, it can also 
deepen divide or hinder the policy process because of a lack of connect between political 
leaders and group leaders. As Kingdon summarizes, “…much of interest group activity in 
these processes consists not of positive promotion, but rather of negative blocking,”
17
. 
Thus, interests groups can serve an important role through their access to resources and 
their ability to organize, but with those benefits comes a possible cost which involves 
deepening the divide between a leader and the group and hindering certain policies from 
being implemented.  
 Along with the aforementioned certain advantages, the interest group-Presidential 
relationship may also hold the stated disadvantages. Because of the various shades the 
interest group-governmental entities relationship can have, these two parties are 
inextricably linked and this collaboration is important because it has yielded particular 
policy results for a Presidential administration to varying degrees of success. This 
relationship has existed for many years among many administrations, right from Jimmy 










Carter to Barack Obama, and it is imperative to examine how this relationship has 
manifested itself over time.  
The Presidency and Interest Groups – The Past Relationship and Implications 
Interest Groups and the Carter Administration 
 Author Mark Peterson addresses two possible systems by which Presidents 
approach their relationships with interest groups. One approach is known as the 
representational approach which aspires to emphasize the legitimacy of a leader and his 
reputation
18
. The other approach is known as the programmatic approach which simply 
enables a Presidential leader to utilize not his desire to fix his reputation in the eyes of the 
people, but to actually accomplish the legislative goals that he set out to achieve
19
. 
Peterson addresses the significant role interest groups have played in the political arena 
with the executive branch by discussing the Carter regime first. Peterson writes citing the 
process of the Carter administration, “President Jimmy Carter discovered early on that 
achieving legislative success would require more than assembling comprehensive 
solutions to the nation's problems and simply offering them to Congress on their merits, 
even when both houses were firmly controlled by his own party. At first Carter was 
stymied almost everywhere he sought congressional action”
20
. According to Paul Light, 
following this period of legislative gridlock, Carter added a woman name Anne Wexler to 
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his staff and initiated the White House Public Liaison Office
21
. Peterson mentions that 
when Carter took this action,  
“The White House staff now ranted Carter's major legislative initiatives a new 
lobbying strategy that combined direct communications with members of 
Congress and the promotion of indirect pressures on Congress by White House-
constructed coalitions of organized interests active in congressional 
constituencies.  This new approach was designed to fuse presidential and 
congressional perspectives by transforming the goals and resources of like-
minded interest groups into the political assets of the White House,”
22
.   
As another product of this relationship, the interest groups became increasingly 
instrumental in the“…drafting of programs from the very beginning to the final bill 
signing,”
23
.   
The important thing to take away from the Carter administration’s significant 
increase of inclusion of interest groups delineates a very significant element to note for 
the executive/interest group relationship. As author John Orman writes:  
“…Carter's direct interaction with interest groups was characterized by high 
frequency of contact with labor unions. Carter met with unions 35 times during 
this 30 month period…Carter met 21 times with elements from the liberal 
coalitions in the form of public interest groups, environmental groups and 
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consumer groups. Moreover, Carter as a born again Christian also met with 
religious groups 21 times. He met with corporate leaders 16 times and he talked 
with educational interests 12 times,”
24
. 
Critics of the Presidency that advocate that he is merely a patron of the interests of 
interest groups, must recognize the importance of political circumstances. In the 
particular case of President Jimmy Carter, it did indeed create a larger role for 
involvement of interest groups in the policy making process, but it was a necessary 
consequence of Congressional gridlock. One must recognize the Carter action as a 
practical measure. As a legislative body, Congress is responsible for the creation of 
measures necessary to maintain the workings of the country, as enumerated by Article I 
of the Constitution
25
. The President is responsible for administering the country, and 
ensuring that Congress is carrying out its job of creating policies for the welfare of 
society
26
. If a circumstance arises and Congress slows its process of lawmaking, it is 
practical for a President to initiate an action which will continue the policy making 
process without hindrance. In Carter’s case, he was having difficulty getting through to 
Congress about his agenda, and promptly decided that working with interest groups to 
improve intra-institutional communication would be the key to pursuing not only the 
legislative ideas he had on his agenda, but also giving Congress a reason to act more in 
accordance with their national role. Improved communication would develop the 
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essential collaboration that needs to exist between the legislative and executive branch to 
administer the policy making process.   
Carter’s action, from a political perspective, may have also served to cement his 
legitimacy as a leader. The cohesion aspect with which interest group involvement 
brought the branches together, an element of importance earlier highlighted by Kingdon, 
was a smart move on his part because if the nation recognizes the coalition building and 
initiative a leader takes to ensure things get accomplished, it only helps legitimize his 
skills and usage of his office. He is supposed to be the individual that makes sure every 
process of the country stays in order, and whatever practical means he may use to ensure 
that, serves as a justification for his action. In this case, critics of the President/interest 
group relationship have to understand the psychology and complexity of this relationship. 
Here Carter was not necessarily trying to advance specific interests. Instead, he was 
seeking the most effective solution to reinvigorate the policy process, and his usage of 
interest groups broke existing barriers and set a precedent for future leaders, which was 
the need of the hour. Carter’s usage of interest groups is an adequate representation of the 
programmatic approach to interest groups. He did not seek to improve his image; he 
sought to achieve the specific policy agenda he had in mind and alleviate his 
Congressional gridlock dilemma. As John Kingdon justifies regarding the benefits of 
utilizing interest groups, “Policy making is often a process of creating intellectual 





. Critics must consider circumstance when looking at the Presidential and 
interest group relationship. 
Interest Groups and The Ford Administration 
 Although it is important for critics to consider circumstances when analyzing the 
interaction between the White House and interest groups, that does not mean that the 
perspective with which Carter looked at interest groups has applied to all Presidents. A 
President with a distinct approach to interest groups was Carter’s predecessor Gerald 
Ford. 
According to Mark Peterson, Ford was the true initiator of the White House 
Public Liaison Office (OPL)
28
. However, Ford’s outlook towards liaising with interest 
groups was different. Contrary to Carter’s approach to get things done, Ford had to 
initiate the OPL for the sake of his career
29
. As mentioned earlier as a possibility with 
Carter, Peterson acknowledges the certainty with which Ford used these groups to 
establish his legitimacy as a leader
30
. Peterson states:  
“President Ford’s political stature and legitimacy as president were threatened by 
Ford's selection via appointment rather than election, Ford's pardon of Richard 
Nixon in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, and the increasingly problematic 
policies for managing the Vietnam War and an economy in deep recession…If 
Ford was to lead the nation free of the Watergate and  Vietnam debacles, he 
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needed to project an image that was inclusive and representational of a  wide 
variety of interests in the United States. ,”
31
. 
Furthermore, Peterson acknowledges the specific strategy advocated by one of Ford’s 
advisors, William Baroody, during this period by stating, “Baroody planned to nurture 
the President's legitimacy by providing an open forum for communications between the 
White House and interests of all kinds (Kumar and Grossman 1986, 97),”
32
.  
Naturally, according to Peterson, Ford utilized the representational approach to 
advance his policy making goals
33
. The reasoning behind that is simple, when comparing 
Ford to Carter. As mentioned earlier, Ford was a victim of scandal, after taking the 
mantle from Nixon. He was not a candidate that the population had voted for and was 
suddenly thrust into the highest office in the nation. Being slightly unprepared for this 
responsibility, Ford had to scramble to put his house in order. He had to decide if he 
wanted to establish a new agenda or stick to plans put in motion by Nixon. Much of this 
chaos led to a failure of cohesion and planning on his part, so he had no choice but to try 
and fix his image within the legislative branch and amongst the public. If he was not able 
to do so, getting anything done would be impossible. As Peterson summarizes, “Given 
the fact that the economic and budgetary crises of the day led the President to avoid any 
new domestic policy initiatives, except in the area of energy policy, there was little need 
for programmatically based group ties,”
34
. Thus in the case of Ford, contrary to Carter, 











his motivation to liaise with interest groups stemmed from a desire to enhance his 
political perception, as opposed to accomplish items on a previously set political agenda.  
Interest Groups and The Reagan Administration 
 Moving forward, the policy making process was completely different during the 
presidency of Ronald Reagan. The structure identified by Peterson as the governing party 
approach
35
 is what is applied to Reagan by him
36
. This approach delineates that a 
President seeks to create his “own party” within the confines of his office
37
. In other 
words, he organizes his staff and interest group liaisons in a manner synonymous to party 
organization, and uses that to fulfill his policy making agenda. Whereas Ford and Carter 
utilized interest groups to move forward either a programmatic or representational aspect 
of their presidency, Reagan utilized his completely different political system to move 
forward—that of partisanship
38
. Mark Peterson writes: 
“Is it the case that the more conservative a group's policy positions, the more 
likely it was to work with the White House?  The simple answer is a clear yes. 
Two-thirds of the groups who favored the most conservative position on the 
provision of federal services had at least occasional interactions with the Reagan 
White House; fewer than a quarter of the most liberal associations had such 
access. A similar pattern is found when groups are categorized according to their 
views on federal regulation. Only 4% of the groups with very liberal views on the 











provision of federal services enjoyed frequent access to the EOP, compared to 
28% of the very conservative organizations.”
39
  
Based on this delineation by Peterson, Reagan’s chief action with interest groups was 
based on their “…ideological positions and observed differences between the two 
political parties relevant to their own concerns,”
40
. Reagan was not concerned with 
pursuing policies specifically for the betterment of his reputation, nor did he witness any 
real danger in Congressional inaction. He instead decided to only enable those interest 
groups which would best represent the conservative ideology, whilst also keeping contact 
with liberal interest groups so as to not blatantly signal the ideological divide initiative he 
put into place. This method comes into direct conflict with the earlier addressed Kingdon 
ideal of less partisanship for better usage of interest groups. Kingdon had argued that if 
partisanship is low, it is more effective for interest groups to work in the policy arena. 
This element is one that Peterson strongly agrees with
41
.  
Peterson argues that this Reagan methodology, albeit interesting, is not extremely 
effective in the long run in the policy making process
42
. The reasoning behind this is that 
the relationship between a President and an interest group is defined by a derived benefit 
that both entities would receive. If one deals with groups that already would be 
supportive of a certain President’s agenda, there is not much to be gained, because that 
resource is already garnered in the process. Instead, the focus should have been on 
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working collaboratively with groups that would be on the fence because getting those 
groups on your policymaking side would enable more efficiency in achieving the goals of 
a policy making agenda
43
. Author John Orman supports Peterson’s findings of group 
alienation with more detail. Orman states:  
“The Reagan Administration  on the other hand did not allow the black 
community as much access to President  Reagan as was the case in the Carter 
administration…Reagan met with black groups at the early stages of his 
administration to try to establish a dialogue. However, by July 1, 1982 the access 
was closed entirely. The leading minority in the Reagan coalition is the Hispanic 
community. Reagan met with hispanic/latino interest  groups more than any other 
group… After his initial thanks for electoral support, the Reagan Administration 
became a place where minority groups could not lobby the president in person. 
This was in keeping with Reagan's rhetoric about being a president for all of the 




Contrary to the element mentioned in this quote regarding Reagan’s rhetoric to narrow 
group interests, Reagan’s strategy and usage of partisanship in fact most directly 
addresses the criticism that Presidents act on the interests of certain interest groups. If 
Reagan worked so closely with only his party’s ideological counterparts, he did not 
employ balanced policy making reasoning, and thus alienated a good chunk of necessary 
resources needed to achieve effectiveness in the process. Harking back to Kingdon’s 
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argument, due to the establishment of a strong partisan divide, Reagan had curtailed the 
usefulness of interactions with interest groups because he had damaged any chance of 
cohesion. Peterson mentions that the start of the Reagan administration was a chaotic 
time of restructuring in Congress
45
, and thus this time demanded cohesion and 
organization to achieve policy goals. Reagan potentially made a strategic mistake when 
he implemented idealism in his administration, and ran the risk of increasing opposition 
to his policy goals. However, another perspective of looking at Reagan’s strategy, may 
also be that of pragmatism, where it would have not been a good use of time for both 
involved stakeholders to engage more. Reagan understood that many of the minority 
groups that he was alienating were ones that would not support his agenda anyway, so to 
include them more participatorily would be an exercise in policymaking futility. This 
theory about interest groups is supported by Heath Brown who says, “As Bacheller 
(1977) found in regard to lobbying on noncontroversial legislation, I expect groups that 
foresee little or no policy change on the horizon will be the least active, assuming that 
activity will be futile and potentially wasteful of group resources…These groups… are 
most likely to remain inactive,”
46
. Based on the dichotomy of the arguments above, it 
seems that Reagan was selective in his work with interest groups, which could have its 
roots in both pragmatism or partisanship. The undeniable conclusion, however, is that 
Reagan was more restrictive in his relationship with interest groups than his predecessors 
had been, which marked a departure in the dynamics of this relationship. Interest groups 
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began to be viewed as resources only to be utilized when they can provide a benefit in 
accordance to the policy of the President, as opposed to simply as entities that represent 
wider aspects.  Peterson sums up Reagan’s administration well by stating, “This begins to 
confirm the anticipated exclusiveness of the relationship between the Reagan White 
House and the interest group community and also suggests that the modern presidency is 
not overwhelmed with interest group solicitors,”
47
.  
Interest Groups and The Clinton Administration 
 The Clinton administration has been founded to exemplify a different aspect of 
the interest group-Presidential relationship. Author Stanley Renshon acknowledges an 
existing theory applied to Clinton called the “need to be liked” theory
48
. What this theory 
delineates is that President Clinton’s policy making strategy was bound by 
appeasement
49
. In other words, his presidency was not governed by a programmatic 
desire to achieve a specific legislative agenda, nor did he seek to improve his image or 
create a personal party system to advance his policy making with interest groups. Instead, 
Renshon addresses, scholars believe that Clinton simply tried to do what others wanted 
him to so as to not create any ill will. Renshon shoots down the applicability of this point. 
He states:  
“The "need to be liked theory" also fails to address another related psychological 
tributary of Clinton's political style, his tendency to build up and then lash out 
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against institutions or groups who oppose his policies. The press is one example 
of such a group but there are others including "lobbyists," "special interests,"  
"profiteering"  drug companies, "greedy doctors," "muscle-bound" labor unions, 
and so on. For a man who is said to have such a strong need to be liked, the list is 
rather long and inclusive. I think the central emotional issue for Clinton, rather 
than a need to be liked is a strong need to be validated, and this need is the key to 
understanding the third key element of character, his stance toward others,”
50
. 
Based on this assessment, Clinton based some of his strategy more on ideological lines, 
similar to Reagan. His disengagement with groups that were not in accordance with him, 
also served to distance his administration from using interest groups as liaisons for policy 
achievement, thus putting into place Kingdon’s danger about involving ideology and 
interest groups.  
However, an interesting element to consider is that Clinton was not completely a 
strict politician set in his ways. He was also perceived to be a bit malleable when it came 
to strategy. On this subject, Renshon addresses that Clinton’s big flaw was actually his 
inability to decide whether he should completely oppose interest groups, and satisfy 
critics of his ways, or work collaboratively with them to achieve certain policy goals that 
may have had
51
. Renshon states that this inability to have a cohesive strategy also 
hampered Clinton’s ability to effectively engage with interest groups. Renshon states that 
despite his opposition to strong interests, Clinton’s “…secretary of commerce, Ronald 
Brown, a Democratic party official with extensive lobbying interests (Labaton, 1992) was 
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prepared to throw a party for corporate lobbyists, charging $10,000 a person for the 
chance at access (Labaton, 1993a). That party was canceled when criticism of it mounted 
(Labaton, 1993b),”
52
. It would be incorrect, however, to look at Clinton’s malleability 
and distance from interest groups solely as an unreasonable strategy. Like Reagan, 
Clinton’s philosophies had a pragmatism attached to them as well. An example of this 
was Clinton’s work with focus groups and the subsequent decisions he made despite 
consulting with these groups. Author Michael Walzer writes on this topic specifically 
with regard to a Republican backed welfare bill, which Clinton signed, despite it being 
different from what Clinton had to recognize as a potential solution
53
. One of the reasons 
Clinton did this, Walzer says, is because he eventually found his version of the policy to 
be fiscally expensive and would require a wider set of resources to be efficient
54
. 
However, Walzer also states that Clinton did this out of being opportunistic
55
. He 
recognized that not only is the Republican alternative more in line with practicality, but 
also, he knew that this bill needed to pass and he needed to look good to do it
56
 thus 
emphasizing the importance of, as discussed earlier, the element of gain to a President 
and/or interest group. Another explanation, tied to the last point, is that Clinton may have 
identified the partisan gridlock which existed during his tenure (it was divided 
government) and was willing to compromise on something like this because he 
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recognized the stakes involved for himself as a leader and thus, his party. By going 
against his focus groups, Clinton displayed a pragmatic and bipartisan strategy in terms 
of this legislation. As Kingdon and Peterson argued, interest groups are significant 
because they can advance policy goals and improve communication between the two 
major branches of government, the executive and the legislative. Without that 
communication, not only is there a stifling of a branch’s job responsibilities, but pertinent 
measures necessary for the country’s function end up in gridlock as well. Kingdon and 
Peterson would probably identify Clinton’s outlook towards interest groups as confused 
and would probably determine his approach being a poor one for interest group 
engagement. They would argue that the fact the he committed to liaising with interest 
groups, and then backed out of appeasement to critics, is a ticket to earning the distrust of 
coalitions that may be necessary to progress a policy agenda. The last thing any President 
should strategically do, if they want better engagement and better chances of success with 
their agendas, is alienate groups that can lobby for the ideas necessary for good policy 
making. This was a major drawback by Clinton, Kingdon and Peterson would argue, and 
that he rivals Reagan in implementing poor engagement choices. However, theorists such 
as Walzer feel that this may have been pragmatic, as shown with what happened with the 
welfare legislation, which once again displays the complexity of the relationship 
Presidents share with interest groups. 
The Presidency and Interest Groups – The Present Perception and Implications 
 On January 21, 2009 President Barack Obama passed Executive Order 13490, 
which put into play the modern presidency’s outlook towards interest groups. In brief, 
this initiative by the President curtailed the involvement of interest group lobbyists by a 
23 
 
few different means. First, it forbade any political appointee from accepting “gifts” from 
lobbying groups
57
. Second, it forbade government employees pursuing careers in interest 
groups from advocating on any issue as a lobbyist during the tenure of Obama’s 
presidency
58
. Similarly, it forbade any executive agency employee from pushing certain 
lobbying ideas within the government for an initial period of two years
59
.  
 Flash forward two years later, the administration still looks upon interest groups 
negatively, as in 2011, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was amended to include 
new, stricter provisions. Looking at the 1995 version of the bill, most notable is section 6. 
This section addresses how frequently a lobbyist must report their activities, income, and 
issues
60
. The Lobbying Disclosure Act Guidance states: 
“Section 5(b) of the LDA requires specific information on the nature of the lobbying 
activities. The Lobbying Activity Section of Form LD-2 requires the registrant to: 
 Disclose the general lobbying issue area code (list 1 code per page). 
 Identify the specific issues on which the lobbyist(s) engaged in lobbying 
activities. 
 Identify the Houses of Congress and Federal Agencies contacted. 
 Disclose the lobbyists who had any activity in the general issue area. 
 Describe the interest of a foreign entity if applicable,”61. 
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Based on the tenets of the executive order and the Lobbying Disclosure Act, the modern 
presidency looks upon interest groups with an attitude of an iron hand. With these 
restrictions, the executive branch has sent a message to interest groups with regard to 
their large influence on the legislative process, where it has been indicated that special 
interests should have a limited role of influence. Through the provisions of his executive 
order, President Obama has addressed the concerns of critics that think government has 
become too interest oriented and he has sought to curtail the unfair advantage that some 
groups may have over others on legislators.   
  Although Obama instituted policies such as prohibiting previous lobbyists from 
pushing their ideas as new government employees, and by restricting newly exiting 
employees from lobbying to the government, this is not to say that Obama is completely 
averse to interest groups. Very much like his predecessors, like Reagan and Clinton, 
Obama can also be looked upon as pragmatic in his relationship with interest groups. 
Author Heath Brown states that one of the motivating factors for interest groups to work 
with a particular administration, besides simply achieving legislative goals, is that, 
“…interest groups look back to the outgoing administration. Groups that are consistently 
deprived of access will ultimately be unable to maintain the loyalty of members or 
supporters and eventually close. A group that saw its access to the White House 
diminished, policy interests harmed, or even was simply ignored by the outgoing 
president, will seek to regain access during a transition,”
62
. This role that this particular 
point plays in terms of Obama is further addressed by Brown when he emphasizes that 
Obama re-instituted the White House Office on Women’s Health and Outreach when 
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groups of women advocated him to do so, after President Bush had removed it during his 
administration
63
. By engaging with a group that had been marginalized by President 
Bush, Obama represented two interesting elements. First, his willingness to bring back an 
office that was removed under the previous administration which belonged to an 
opposing party, indicates that Obama may have looked at this action as a necessary one 
for cementing the credibility of his administration and his party. By supporting this group 
of women, Obama displayed to them that he, as the face of his party and nation, 
identified with their cause and was willing to work with them, where perhaps a previous 
leadership did not share the same value. This action can be interpreted as a partisan one 
for that reason. Second, Obama’s re-establishment of the office indicates that he was 
willing to work with interest groups when he found the cause to be justified, whether for 
political gain or identification with the cause. This is further supported by Brown’s 
argument that Obama while working with interest groups to determine his transition 
team, “…even chose the leader of a politically oriented think tank, John Podesta of the 
Center for American Progress (CAP), to run his transition…”
64
. Brown also addresses 
that Obama selected strong Democratic candidates for agencies which were responsible 
for strong policy issues like Eric Holder with the Department of Justice, while picking a 
more bipartisan option in issue areas of lesser importance, like Raymond LaHood for 
transportation
65
.  In other words, Obama made these decisions through interacting with 
interest groups, thus displaying that he is willing to work with them when appropriate. 












These were all actions, Brown says, that were a product of, “…’the first 100 days’ in 
office has become a feature of modern presidential politics…,”
66
.  Based on these ideas, 
Obama can be looked upon as both pragmatic and partisan because he recognized that 
such a measure would be beneficial to his new administration and to his party
67
. The 
pragmatism also holds true because Obama’s strict yet continuing interaction with 
interest groups helped him use those as a resource for moving policy and setting up a 
team that supports those approaches. Because he did this to cement his reputation and 
enhance his new role as the leader of his party and nation, Obama definitely employed a 
representational approach in his work with interest groups. He also instituted a form of 
the governing party model because by hiring someone like John Podesta to his transition 
team, and even Eric Holder in an important policy area, he emphasized an organization 
that valued stronger Democratic principles.  
Both the governing party model and representational model seem to apply here, 
also programmatic with Obama’s focus on a specific set of policy goals, but the key 
element here is the attempt to create an organic policy process. It’s not focused on 
completely alienating interest groups, simply aspiring to prevent the accusations of 
corruption that have plagued presidencies over the years. This can enable a group to not 
see disengagement on part of the President, yet not become too “chummy” with his set 
policy goals either. 
 It is difficult to truly determine how Obama’s strategy has worked. He is still 
pragmatically open to interacting with interest groups as he seems to recognize the help 








they can provide in helping the policy making process move forward, but he is also 
maintaining just enough distance so that an interest group does not overbear the policy 
making agenda, though partisan motivations may have been one of his motivations for 
taking this action as opposed to looking at interest groups simply as negative resources. 
The fact that the Lobbying Disclosure Act was even implemented in the Clinton era, and 
recently added amendments, cements and reinforces the slight distance Obama wants to 
keep from the interest groups. By keeping tabs on the various issues lobbyists are 
advocating for, the government can stay well informed on perhaps what policy ideas 
strongly represent the “interests” of interest groups over necessary policy goals. That 
way, when engaging with them, they can utilize their resources well by liaising with the 
right groups, whilst avoiding more radical ones. In this respect, there is a strict balance, 
but it may not be one that an interest group can blatantly identify.  
 These measures seem to be safest ones for the policy making process, which 
strive to make engagement with appropriate control, yet strict enforcement of integrity. 
President Obama may have discovered the key and significance to balancing the highly 
debated relationship between the executive and interest groups. 
Is The Current Relationship Justified? 
 With the passing and subsequent modifications to the Lobbying Disclosure Act, 
the Obama administration's strict application to the interest group relationship to 
government warrants an examination of whether this initiative is fair. After all, the policy 
advantages this relationship has, have been identified. However, legitimate concerns on 
Presidential behavior with interest groups must be taken into account, which justify the 
current approach the government has initiated. According to an article by Jonathan C. 
28 
 
Smith, one of the Presidents that was a victim of interest group influence was President 
Bill Clinton
68
. According to Smith, in 1994,  
“President Clinton held a White House Press Conference and reversed the U.S. 
policy of accepting Cuban immigrants into the United States...The New Republic 
contended that the president was the victim of interest group politics--in 
particular, the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF) and its leader, 
Jorge Mas Canosa. The article contended that "Mas (Canosa) had pulled off the 
coup of his career--dictating America's new Cuba policy...This article speculated 
that the president's motivations for towing the Mas Canosa line revolved around 




Based on this statement, President Clinton received campaign contributions from a 
particular interest group and used that relationship to alter a particular policy that was 
already in place in the foreign policy scenario. The specific factors behind this action, 
Smith argues, are that, “The Clinton administration's management style also enhances the 
possibility of interest group politics affecting its policy. First, the administration in 
general and the president in particular appear to be very receptive to interest 
groups...second, the administration's handling of the Cuban immigration crisis was 
viewed by some as disorganized and chaotic,”
70
. Interestingly, a series of factors 
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discussed earlier make an appearance in this situation, however they had a negative 
implication on the President-interest group relationship. It seems that President here 
relied too much on support from a particular interest group to move his policy agenda 
forward, so much so that the interest group entity ultimately used its leverage over the 
President and subtly influenced him to make a decision grounded in the wrong ethics. 
Ethically, the President should engage and make a decision after appropriate interaction 
with all stakeholders. But here, as Smith states, “President Clinton consulted almost 
exclusively with the conservative elements of this community during the crisis. This 
deprived the president of alternative viewpoints, some of which he probably would have 
preferred, and gave the CANF the role as sole spokesman for the Cuban-American 
community,”
71
. Smith further states, “Through a rigorous examination of contemporary 
media, journal, and book sources on the subject, what is found is that the CANF did have 
some influence, although not nearly so much as popular media suggests. Furthermore, the 
actions of the Clinton administration in consulting only the CANF deprived it of other 
perspectives within the Cuban-American community. In this way, the administration 
added to the power of the CANF and, consequently, increased its influence,”
72
.  
 Based on these points by Smith, the strict approach by President Obama is 
completely justified. The simple reason behind this is that if an element such as a 
“campaign contribution” can enable a President to make a sweeping policy change 
without widespread consideration, then that sets a dangerous precedent of what campaign 














 The relationship that interest groups and the President share is multifaceted as it 
contains differing motivations and circumstances that dictate how that relationship is 
played out. In a highly complex policy making process, the existence of this coalition 
building between governmental and non-governmental entities further complicates the 
movement of the political machine. Looking at the relationships different presidential 
administrations have shared with interest groups, it is safe to conclude that Paul Light’s 
theory of disengagement of the relationship between the executive branch and interest 
groups is too simplistic. Disengagement may most certainly occur, which may be 
intentional or inadvertent, but each leader also recognizes that interest groups can be 
significant resources when it comes to fulfilling aspects of a Presidential agenda. 
Although some administrations have maintained more of a distance from interest groups 
than others like Reagan, Clinton, and Obama, the acknowledgment of dealing with 
interest groups one way or another is a point that must be noted. The truth is that interest 
groups are a key component in the administration of any President, though they can 
approach that relationship in different ways. The manner in which a President engages 
with interests groups can be programmatic, representational, governing party based, or 
aloof. Each of the leaders discussed in this chapter have used interest groups as a 
resource, whether through engagement or distance, to advance their specific policy 
agendas. Reagan and Clinton are examples of leaders who employed both partisanship 





and ideology to fulfill their agendas, which may have been pragmatic methods to tackle a 
divided Congress and keep away interest groups which would oppose their goals. Obama 
also is an example who used executive action to curtail interest group activity in 
Congress, so that he could advance his policy goals without competing interests having 
strong influence over legislators who are on the other side of the aisle. Ford is a different 
example then the aforementioned because he used his interest group relationship to 
enhance his tenure by building more bridges with them and helping them move his 
policies through the legislative process. Finally, Carter also used them to legitimize his 
leadership by fostering an environment of engagement which would help balance the 
journey of his policies through a gridlocked Congress. 
The analysis presented in this work is simply the tip of the iceberg when 
examining this relationship and the many implications it has for the policy making 
process and the relationship between these entities. However, contrary to Light’s 
argument that interest groups are not integral to the policy process and President’s tend to 
not view them as significant, for the past 3 decades, interest groups have been an integral 
party in the agenda for the executive branch as evidenced by the roles Presidents such as 
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Chapter 2 - Watching Your Back: How The Importance of The Relationship Between 
The President and Media 
 
 The key manner in which the public receives information on the agenda and work 
of the President comes from the media. In its current form, the media is comprised of 
many different sources whether it be print (newspapers, magazines) or electronic 
(websites, social networks) and constitutes both journalistic and personal media. Yet, the 
media has not only been a source of information for the public but also as a resource for 
policymakers and the President. Speculation about the media’s role in shaping policy has 
been debated, particularly with regard to being used as a tool in assisting and working 
with the President in shaping and promoting his political agenda. This subject has been 
the fodder for a variety of theorists, who hold a plethora of views. One noteworthy view 
is provided by authors George C. Edwards III and B. Dan Wood who state when 
discussing Presidential agenda setting, “The White House invests substantial energy and 
time in attempting to shape the media’s attention,”
74
. Another significant scholar, Paul C. 
Light, states about the media, “One is perhaps most surprised to find the media amongst 
the three bottom sources. The media is usually viewed as a critical participant in the 
agenda process...Yet, for the White House staffs...viewed the media more as a source of 
pressure than as a supplier of ideas,”
75
. It is important to note the dichotomy between 
these two different theories, particularly the latter. Based on Light's theory, although the 
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media does not assist a President in shaping his policy agenda, they do provide external 
force to take action on certain policy initiatives.  
 Although Light acknowledges the existences of some sort of link, albeit small, 
between the President and the media, it cannot be overlooked that the President can, if 
properly strategized, use the media as a forum to promote his policies. This strategy can 
serve to ultimately enhance his public image and legitimize his role as a leader. 
Alternately, the media can negatively impact the success of a Presidential agenda or 
specific policy goal as well, creating roadblocks for the implementation of that particular 
aspect.  
A pertinent basic element to consider about the theories from Light and Edwards 
and Wood is to examine the extent to which their conclusions are true. Light implies that 
that the media and President only have a somewhat peripheral relationship. In other 
words, we have to look at under what circumstances can a President use the media to 
effectively lead either a specific policy item or general policies to success and enhance 
his image. If this relationship has been built in various capacities over time, what does 
this say about the President and his relationship with the media? Is it really an 
unimportant source?  
To consider the answers to these questions, it is important to examine how this 
relationship has played out in particular Presidential administrations. For the purposes of 
this study, we will first address the basic reasons why media is in an important element to 
look at in relationship to politics and then we will examine President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt as an example of a President who used it successfully to enhance both his 
public image and policies. Then we will examine the views of the Barack Obama 
37 
 
administration towards the media, how media was used for Obama’s campaigns, and how 
interaction with the media within the context of his policy on healthcare impacted its 
success and Obama’s image as a leader. President Obama in particular is an apt subject 
for examination because he exemplifies the modern Presidency and conveys the most 
recent application of the media/President relationship.  I theorize that the success and 
impact of this relationship on presidential policy goals can come from the ability of a 
President to build a coalition which legitimizes his public image and thus develops a 
confidence within involved parties (such as Congress) for policy success. However, if not 
handled properly, this relationship can also backfire and thus prove that ultimately the 
media is an independent entity out to behave only with its own interests. Thus, the extent 
to which a President is able to do tread a self-serving influential line with the media and 
its usage, governs the fruitfulness of this relationship, as supplemented by Jeffrey S. 
Peake, “Presidential success and power in the policy process is likely to increase if the 
President is able to influence congressional, media, and public attention to issues,”
76
. 
Why Is The Media A Factor To Look At? – A Look At Some Theories 
 Author John W. Kingdon in his book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies 
succinctly addresses some of the main reasons why the media should be considered an 
important factor when looking at the political realm
77
. Echoing Paul C. Light, Kingdon 
states, “Media are often portrayed as powerful agenda setters. Mass media clearly do 
                                                          
76
Jeffrey S. Peake, “Presidential Agenda Setting In Foreign Policy,” Political Research Quarterly 54, no. 1 
(Mar., 2001): 70, accessed July 24, 2014, http://www.jstor.org/stable/449208 
 
77




affect the public opinion agenda,”
78
. The reason it is important to note the “public 
opinion” point is best outlined by Kingdon's statement that, “...media attention to an issue 
affects legislators' attention, partly because members follow mass media like other 
people, and partly because media affects their constituents...Active policy makers often 
express their disdain for media sensationalism,”
79
. From these statements one of the 
important things that comes out is that what the media portrays, even if lawmakers look 
at some of the portrayals as extreme, they consider them keenly because it impacts not 
only their work but also their standing and chances for re-election. These factors, 
particularly that of re-election, could be applied to a President as well since he is also an 
elected official and is answerable to the citizens of the nation as constituents.  As 
President Barack Obama states in his 2006 book “The Audacity of Hope”, “But for the 
politician who is worried about keeping his seat, there is a third force that pushes and 
pulls at him, that shapes the nature of political debate and defines the scope of what he 
feels he can and can't do, the positions he can and can't take...that force is the media,”
80
. 
Because of those concerns, the President has to maintain a certain standard of a 
relationship with the various mediums of the media because he knows that they could 
portray him and his initiatives in a negative or positive light. Paul Light supports this by 
stating, “First, we know the Presidents pay attention to it. Issues that appear in either print 
or electronic media are accorded some status on that basis alone. Second, newspapers and 
television often provide useful summaries of activities of Congress, the bureaucracy, and 
the public; ideas that originate in these sources often reach the President through the 













. Furthermore, Edwards and Wood state, “…presidential approval is strongly 
influenced by elite opinion as brought to the public’s attention in the mass media,”
82
. 
Kingdon also argues that the media is important because it gives a mediating 
method to connect various entities that otherwise may not be aware of the other's passion 
on a certain issue and can enhance movement on that issue
83
. In other words, for 
example, if an animal rights group is passionate for a specific cause but do not know that 
the President is working on an initiative that advances that cause, the media can report it 
and bring the awareness between the two parties. The President would then also know 
which groups he can count on to pressurize and spread awareness with Congress. Thus, 
the ability to connect to the general public, spread a message, and provide information 
delineate the very important role the media can play in the political arena and thus give 
the President a multitude of reasons to seek out collaboration with them and shape his 
image to his advantage. Authors Marion Just and Anne Crigler support this argument by 
stating, “The media and other officials construct different images of the president. In a 
reciprocal process, how the president and other officials construct his image finds its way 
into the press and then to the public, and how the media portray the president may 
influence how other officials and the public think about the president. Throughout an 
administration, the public's image of the president is a crucial ingredient of political 
power. These are the parameters which will be used in the study to characterize the 
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meaning of the relationship between the media and the President,”
84
. Thus, the 
overarching element to remember when analyzing the dynamics of the relationship 
between the President and the media is how it ultimately portrays the image of the leader 
and whether such a portrayal undermines or stimulates a particular policy goal. 
FDR: Fireside Chats As An Instrument Of Media Usage 
 Media forms have evolved over time in many ways, but one of the pioneers to use 
it to project policy ideas to the public (and governmental institutions) was President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt. During his administration, Roosevelt was wracked by a 
variety of challenges. On the one hand, he had to contend with American involvement in 
World War II
85
 , while on the other the nation was desperately seeking economic 
recovery after the “The Great Depression”
86
. It thus became imperative for Roosevelt to 
seek a strategy through which he could not simply connect with the public and Congress 
on his plans to tackle these issues, but also showcase his legitimacy by projecting himself 
as someone who is in touch and willing to try new means by which he could carry his 
message. The method by which Roosevelt decided would be best to present his ideas was 
known as the “Fireside Chats” conducted via radio
87
. 
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Author Richard W. Steele states regarding Roosevelt at wartime, “Roosevelt's 
public information strategy reflected in large measure the ambiguous situation he 
confronted… Maintaining public support without limiting his freedom of action naturally 
suggested to the president the traditional propaganda of patriotic platitudes, atrocity 
stories, and glorification of "the cause" that had worked well in the past. But the utility of 
that approach had suffered in the general disillusionment with American participation in 
World War I…Roosevelt consciously shied away from the now repudiated forms of 
government propaganda, choosing instead to “sell” the administration’s position through 
an “informational” propaganda strategy,”
88
.  Based on Steele’s statement, Roosevelt had 
to devise a mass strategy that would not only connect him with the public, but also truly 
convince them that his decisions were correct. During his tenure as Governor of New 
York, Roosevelt had utilized radio to enhance his role as Governor by keeping the 
citizens of the state informed of his initiatives, as well as, to move his policies through 
the legislature
89
. In his article on Roosevelt’s original usage of radio, Geoffrey Storm 
writes, “During his two gubernatorial terms, Roosevelt found that the reaction elicited by 
his radio addresses was useful as leverage to skirt an obstructionist Republican 
legislature. He also came to see such reaction as a means of weighing popular 
opinion,”
90
. At that time, the form of radio was the format by which information could be 
disseminated in the best possible manner, as Lumeng (Jenny) Yu states, “Radio brought 
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news alive, but left people free to create images in their imagination,”
91
. Keeping his 




One of the most famous, and perhaps most significant, usages of radio by 
President Roosevelt can be linked to his “Day of Infamy” speech
93
. As stated earlier, on 
the foreign policy front, Roosevelt had to find a way to convince a public who was 
frustrated with World War I that going to war this time was the best way forward. 
Roosevelt decided to give a speech via his “Fireside Chats” appealing to the public and 
Congress that war be declared following Pearl Harbor
94
. In his speech, Roosevelt stated, 
“Yesterday, December 7th, 1941 -- a date which will live in infamy -- the United States 
of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire 
of Japan… As commander in chief of the Army and Navy, I have directed that all 
measures be taken for our defense…I believe that I interpret the will of the Congress and 
of the people when I assert that we will not only defend ourselves to the uttermost, but 
will make it very certain that this form of treachery shall never again endanger us…I ask 
that the Congress declare that since the unprovoked and dastardly attack by Japan on 
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Regarding the impact of the speech, Lumeng (Jenny) Yu summarizes: 
“The power of his "Day of Infamy" speech led the nation to unite behind the 
President's call to war, and his fireside chats gained him support from the people 
for innovative and controversial social programs. ..It was the first time that 
citizens felt as if they knew their president as a friend…Later, with the advent of 
war, the press was even more deferential; support of the war effort meant not 
second-guessing the president. His relationship with the press was one source of 
FDR's strength as a communicator.  
The other was his relationship with the public. As with any successful politician, 
FDR's power came from the people. Radio provided him with a direct link to his 
voting public and the next generation of voters…His use of radio helped him win 
people's hearts. Even those who did not support his programs and presidency 




According to John Kingdon’s theory on media importance, the key elements he addressed 
were its ability to reflect public opinion, serve as a source of information, and connect 
entities that otherwise may not know they have a mutual interest
97
. In this case of 
Roosevelt, we see that Roosevelt was able to use the medium to address public concerns. 
He did not necessarily “reflect” public concerns through his use, but instead sought to 
pacify them through a means by which he could project his initiatives and assure them 
that he knew what was best for the nation, after a difficult time. His personal use of the 
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radio gave the public a chance to see “his perspective”, as opposed to one sided reports 
by the media
98
 and thus gave people a direct source of information on the Presidency. In 
some ways, this can be considered landmark as the public now had a primary source to 
look at for executive information rather than reliance only on the media. The President 
also was able to use this to enhance his image and legitimacy by establishing that 
personal connection necessary to be a good leader, and “reserve” your spot with your 
constituents. Through the elements of disseminating information publicly and asserting 
his image via his radio chats, Roosevelt was able to use the media to build a successful 
effort of support for his initiatives. He proved that working with the media was possible 
to legitimize the Presidential role and connect with the people whom sought a strong 
executive and information. By doing so, Roosevelt fulfilled two of the reasons of media 
importance delineated by Kingdon, and also Jeffery Peake
99
, and showed that the media 
can be an important source for the President when used correctly.  
The Obama Campaign – A Look At Obama-Social Media Usage During Campaigns 
As stated earlier, Jeffrey Peake stated that the power of a President and his ability 
to achieve his policy goals comes from his ability to influence factors such as the media 
and the public
100
 which is a significant conclusion to come to because the primary goal of 
any President is to ensure not only the success of his policy, but to legitimize his image. 
Legitimacy only comes when, for the most part, the public and legislative bodies 
recognize the importance of specific policy ideas through support of the same. Naturally, 
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a leader cannot guarantee unanimous backing for everything he does, but there are 
strategies that he can use to convince, sway, and build up coalitions to move an idea 
along and make sure the proper force is applied to those whom oppose it. The only way a 
leader can bring attention to something that is of importance to him (and to the running of 
the nation) is to utilize novel tactics and means which strive to engage those parties to 
whom the leader wants to appeal to. As President Obama himself stated on the media, “I-
like every politician at the federal level-am almost entirely dependent on the media to 
reach my constituents,”
101
. President Obama, especially, realized that gone are the days 
where simply televised debates and newspaper/magazine ads are enough to establish the 
necessity to meet certain policy goals. Something new and fresh had to be done, and 
through his own initiative and work with his staff, Obama found the answer he was 
looking for.  
 The first public platform that an aspiring candidate for President uses to establish 
his/her policy goals comes in the form of the campaign. As Bruce Bimber aptly states, 
“Election campaigns are communication campaigns. Throughout the sweep of democratic 
history, changes in communication environments have precipitated adaptation on the part 
of the parties and other intermediary organizations that link citizens to democratic 
institutions, as well as on the part of the citizens themselves,”
102
.  President Obama was 
no different when he opted to utilize his presidential campaigns, particularly for his 
second term, to lay out his policy framework for the future. However, in order to both 
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secure a victory and ensure that he had the means to define his policy agenda, Obama and 
his campaign team decided to use a new approach to garner support.  
Bruce Bimber writes in terms of Obama, “His use of social media was no more 
than one of many factors in his win in 2008, while his campaign’s adaptation to new 
technical possibilities had a more distinct effect on his success in 2012,”
103
. Under the 
context of social media, Obama made videos on Youtube, as well as sites such as 
Facebook, LinkedIn, and Flickr
104
.By using these new technologies, for both 2008 and 
2012, Bimber states, “…the new political communication environment permitted Obama 
to embrace social-movement-like enthusiasm and personalized entrepreneurialism among 
his supporters while also running a highly disciplined, centrally organized campaign…the 
Obama campaign exploited data analytics to engage in an unprecedented level of 
personalized message-targeting in a handful of state, in order to win a closer election with 
highly honed, state-by-state tactics,”
105
. Specifically, strategy wise, in 2008, Bimber 
writes that Obama sought to use media as, “…a strategic decision to embrace a wide 
variety of communication opportunities and to integrate these with the fundamental tasks 
of the campaign…,”
106
. This strategy, and the motivation behind it, shifted slightly in 
2012, as Andrew Romano states,  
“The plan for 2012, according to Axelrod, is to tout the president’s achievements 
while also recognizing that “people are less interested in a tote sheet of what has 














been accomplished” than in “how we, and alternatively how the other side, would 
approach the larger economic challenges” facing the middle class…To figure out 
who each of us is, and what each of us wants, Slaby and his team are constructing 
a “microlistening” and computer modelling programme that will comb online and 
off-line behaviour patterns for voter information, then use it to personalise every 




Since he used individual messages to reach his voters and used a novel campaign 
emphasizing the individuality of voters, Obama exhibited how engagement with those 
whom you represent yields successful results for maintaining your image and displaying 
yourself as a “normal person” whom can best represent policy interests. When that 
connection is made, the task of garnering support for your initiatives becomes easier 
because the people know that they can trust you. The usage of social media in this case 
was a big contributor to Obama’s successful campaigns in both 2008 and 2012. This is 
what the Kingdon theory, discussed earlier, underlies. Under the Kingdon theory, a 
leader’s desire to engage more with his constituents to maintain his image and ensure 
possible reelection
108
, was what Obama effectively did at the campaign level. Thus, 
through the use of social media, Obama was able to meet his goals and displayed how 
media usage for engagement can help achieve certain leadership goals. 
The Obama Campaign – A Brief Note On Obama’s Relationship With The Print 
and Visual Press 
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 Obama’s effective usage of social media to establish a connect with the people 
was not as effectively translated to his relationship with the media during his 
campaigning days before his first term. Author Reid Cherlin states about Obama in 2008, 
“Even as Obama was showing off an electrifying knack for motivating and organizing 
people, his team was beginning to grapple with what was quite obviously a media world 
in the throes of reinvention. To start with, there was Politico, a website founded just as 
the race began. Opinionated, grabby and lightning-quick, Politico played to the 
adrenaline junkie in every reader with content that was cheap to produce and a subject -- 
the vagaries of political fortune -- that was inexhaustible. Obama's advisers detested 
Politico from the start, accurately recognizing its potential to wreak havoc on their 
carefully crafted narratives, and to inspire their competitors to indulge in the same bad 
habits,”
109
. Furthermore, Cherlin outlines that after a particularly negative article on 
Obama in The Huffington Post, Obama and his team decided to stay away from the 
media as much as possible and focus more on the personal interactions with the voting 
base
110
. Thus, during his campaign, Obama adopted a strict  approach to the media, in 
contrast to his more open nature of usage of social media for personal interactions with 
constituents, thus emphasizing the importance he on legitimacy through connect and not 
through the delineations by a third party medium which operated solely on its need to 
deliver content for consumerism.  
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The Obama Administration – The Media and President’s Relationship In General 
Terms 
 After looking at Obama’s campaign strategies and before we proceed and take a 
look at the specifics of Obamacare and the interplay between Obama and the media 
during that time, it is important to examine viewpoints and actions taken by the President 
to define his stance on that relationship after his election.  
 One of the most important directives that Obama issued during his administration 
was the Open Government Initiative in 2009
111
, which symbolizes his overarching views 
on his relationship with the public via media. In a memo to his cabinet, Obama wrote, 
“My Administration is committed to creating an unprecedented level of openness in 
Government. We will work together to ensure the public trust and establish a system of 
transparency, public participation, and collaboration. Openness will strengthen our 
democracy and promote efficiency and effectiveness in Government,”
112
. He goes on to 
outline that the cornerstone of this policy would be to make sure that government is 
transparent, participatory, and collaborative
113
. Harking back to the theory that Presidents 
can use the media to legitimize their image by establishing a connect with their 
constituents, this was such a representation by Obama. By initiating this measure, Obama 
displayed his willingness to not only engage various media forms to disseminate his 
policy goals, but also to enhance his image as a “man of the people” and augment a 
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citizen’s involvement with their government and their leader. As John T Snead states, 
“Agencies invest resources to increase published government information through their 
websites, adopt social media as mechanisms to increase public participation with the 
information…Individuals are actively visiting agency websites…and using agency 
adopted social media to stay informed of agency activities. Interactions between agency 
personnel and the public through agency adopted social media suggest that government 
use of social media is a potential viable means to increase public participation with 
government…Essentially the Obama administration is committed to increasing 
transparency and openness in government and this commitment is based in part on the 
ideal that transparency and openness occurs when an informed public interacts with and 
informs government policy making processes and has a broadened level of access to 
government information,”
114
. Thus, by emphasizing the importance and open nature of 
social media, Obama enhanced public participation in his administration, cementing his 
image in the eyes of the public as a leader who cares for his people and gives them the 
governmental information they seek.  
Although Obama used social media to his advantage effectively, his relationship 
with the print and press media has been of a rocky nature. In essence, there has been an 
evolution in the extent to which his relationship with the media has escalated for the 
worse, which has brought days of stinging criticism in the post-election time period from 
2008 onwards. In his article in the Huffington Post, author Jason Grill describes a few 
incidents with quotes by the President which reveal his views on media opposition
115
. 
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One of the examples Grill cites pertains to the time period when the President was in hot 
water over his place of birth
116
. Grill writes,  
“The political noise became so loud that President Obama held a press conference 
on April 27, 2011 at the White House to make a statement on the release of a full 
detailed version of his birth certificate. The president stated he watched for over 
two and half years with bemusement and was puzzled with the degree at which 
the noise kept on going…  
Normally, a president would not comment on issues such as these, given all the 
political accusations and baiting that takes place in the press and in Washington 
DC. However, this time he did because the matter had taken over the political 
dialogue and taken away from important policy issues that were facing the 




This became one of the first instances which contributed to the friction between Obama 
and the media, which hadn’t existed as much during his days of campaigning. In fact, 
Obama characterized the media circus by stating, “We do not have time for this silliness. 
We’ve got better stuff to do. I’ve got better stuff to do. We’ve got big problems to solve. 
And I’m confident that we can solve them, but we’re going to have to focus on them—
not on this,”
118
.This continued when a rumor was proliferated by the press that President 













Obama was a follower of Islam
119
. In order to tackle this, when Obama did interact in 
public or before the media, he tactfully addressed these claims, as Grill writes, “President 
Obama took the bait from a small majority of Americans and the press; however he was 
able to handle the moment in a well-delivered and thoughtful manner…President Obama 
has also taken the bait and faced adversity in a lighthearted manner,”
120
. At this midterm 
juncture in his Presidential career, President Obama adopted a stance of passive 
admonishment to the press around him. By doing this, however, President Obama did not 
realize that he was slowly alienating the print/TV press and this would produce 
subsequent ramifications for how the press would address any policy initiative that he 
initiated, including Obamacare (more on that in a later section). 
 As it currently stands, authors Reid Cherlin
121
 and Michael Goodwin
122
 feel that 
as of 2014 there is a noticeable negative disconnect between Obama and the print/TV 
media. Reid Cherlin states, “…if you are a consumer of any kind of political news these 
days, the only impression you get is that the Obama presidency is on the verge of 
collapse, and that he either doesn't know or doesn't seem to care. It's a complete 
disconnect, and it has everything to do with how the president is covered,”
123
. Cherlin 
goes on to cite an example of how when President Obama made a trip abroad and met 
with leaders in East Asia, his then Press Secretary Jay Carney refused to allow the media 
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to attend the meeting and take note of the content of the talks
124
. Michael Goodwin offers 
a possible explanation as to the reason that Obama has become more distant from the 
media in instances such as this. He states, “With multiple crises spiraling out of control 
around the world, stories about the Obama presidency are taking on the air of 
postmortems. What went wrong, who’s to blame, what next — even The New York 
Times is starting to recognize that Dear Leader is a global flop… The accounts and others 
like them amount to an autopsy of a failed presidency,”
125
. What can be inferred from 
Goodwin’s quote and the intimations by Cherlin is that Obama is most likely evolving his 
passive admonishment doctrine with the media to one of distance. Whereas before he was 
lightly making statements on how the media should behave, he has become more firm in 
his dealing with them, relegating his once affable and neutral tone to the back seat. In the 
context of the foreign visit situation described above, Cerlin states that Obama wanted to 
convey to the media that, “…you guys are scoring it like a campaign debate, and 
moreover, you're doing it inaccurately. He went further, telling the dozen or so reporters 
that what he favored was a judicious use of American power, and that his primary 
concern was not to get the country embroiled in situations from which it might take a 
decade to extract ourselves,”
126
. Because of his understanding of the media as an 
important tool that disseminates information pertaining to his leadership, and fearing the 
harm that the negative press was bringing to him, Obama has decided to take a more 
cautious approach now to maintain a certain formal standard between himself and the 
media. He wants to convey their freedom of discussing his policies, yet does not want to 
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diminish his image through negativity. He knows he cannot restrict the press, so by 
displaying to them a more strict exterior, Obama is defining his executive power and 
motivations behind his actions. The logic in this tactic is that even if the press is against 
him, the public who consumes the media can better understand the President’s 
perspective behind the actions which are being publicly questioned.  
 One more item to consider is that the aforementioned descriptions may make it  
 
seem as if Obama’s standoffishness and potential policy failures are the sole factors for  
 
the declining portrayal of Obama by the media. Goodwin, however, argues against this  
 
solitary argument as well. He writes,  
 
“…the blame starts with the media. By giving the president the benefit of the 
doubt at every turn, by making excuses to explain away fiascos, by ignoring 
corruption, by buying the White House line that his critics were motivated by pure 
politics or racism, the Times and other organizations played the role of bartender 
to a man on a bender. 
Even worse, they joined the party, forgetting the lessons of history as well as their 
own responsibilities to put a check on power. A purpose of a free press is to hold 
government accountable, but there is no fallback when the watchdog voluntarily 
chooses to be a lapdog,”
127
. 
According to Goodwin, in fact more than Obama, it is the media which is at fault for not 
only feeding a particular perception of Obama, but also through their over indulgence in 
fueling his confidence whether he was right or wrong. As a result of this immoral 
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encouragement and practice, since the press is supposed to report on the truth and not 
take any sides, Obama lost focus on how to carry himself and how to effectively make 
policy decisions as the Commander-in-Chief. He surrounded himself with his internal and 
external (media) yes men, and dug himself into deeper holes as a leader. Through this 
quandary, two important revelations are made. One is that this reveals how media, 
whether it is for or against a President, can hamper the image and policy initiatives of that 
leader. Secondly, it also reveals that the relationship between the modern media and 
Presidency is very fragile. Obama started his administration with the goal of increasing 
transparency and better connecting with his constituents, which he was able to 
accomplish, but in having a singled minded focus on only using his own media outlets to 
project himself, Obama distanced himself from the widespread media which he also 
needed to bolster his image and policy initiatives. He should have heeded any criticism 
that the media provided him with and should not have maintained a confident blind eye to 
the concerns surrounding him. Understanding those concerns would have served him 
better when tackling particular policy issues. Since it is, “…the media which influences 
the President’s agenda rather than the other way around”
128
, Obama would have been 
better served if he maintained a more cordial and neutral relationship with the media 
where he does not get trapped in his image, but rather seeks to better it to achieve his 
agenda in a more pragmatic manner.  
The Story Behind Obamacare  
 Arguably, the most significant accomplishment of President Obama’s legislative 
agenda over the course of his term has been the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
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Act, whose popular derivation is known as Obamacare. In brief, Obamacare has been 
described as a law which gives “…Americans a number of new benefits, rights, and 
protections in regards to their healthcare, and setting up a Health 
Insurance Marketplace where Americans can purchase federally regulated and subsidized 
health insurance during open enrollment. The law also expands Medicaid, 
improves Medicare, requires you to have coverage in 2014 and beyond, and contains 
some new taxes and tax breaks, among other things,”
129
. Being a policy that had its roots 
all the way back to the Clinton administration, the road to get this legislation passed was 
wrought with a plethora of legislative challenges along the way
130
.  
 After President Obama took office, the idea of being able to provide healthcare to 
all became the most important aspect of his policy agenda
131
. He immediately began 
formulating a strategy to work on the measure and eventually what he decided was that 
he would not, “…draft a detailed reform proposal, leaving the job to Congress,”
132
. 
Unbeknownst to Obama, this decision would ultimately create even more hurdles in his 
path as eventually Congress was unable to figure out the best way forward to better 
American’s health care system
133
. As Will Dunham states in an article about the 
progression of events leading up to the passage of Obamacare, “Congress fails to meet 
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Obama's deadline of passing initial healthcare legislation by August, as Republican and 
industry opposition hardens. Republicans oppose a proposal to create a new government-
run health insurance program, called the "public option," to give Americans an alternative 
to private insurers. During August, people opposed to Obama's healthcare ideas confront 
Democratic lawmakers at "town hall" style meetings around the country, some 
denouncing the reform proposals as socialism,”
134
. Following these road bumps, after 
some lobbying by Obama, Obamacare finally got through its first hurdle and was 
approved by House of Representatives, with some changes
135
. The second hurdle of 
clearing the Senate also followed shortly thereafter, but a new problem emerged
136
. 
Although healthcare passed both houses, there were discrepancies between the two 
distinct versions of it, which needed to be ironed out
137
. Partisanship began to stall the 
progress of the bill, thus Obama attempted to quell the bickering by finally giving to both 
houses what he felt an ideal version of the bill would look like
138
. This did not 
particularly ease the tension that was already present, and only after there was a shift in 
partisan dynamics in the 2010 election period, were any hopes of getting Obamacare 
passed present
139
. After a series of negotiations between Obama and party leaders from 
the House of Representatives and Senate, both parties eventually agreed on an identical 





















bill and Obamacare was signed into law by the President
140
. It must also be noted that 
strong Democratic support was also key for the passage of Obamacare, as authors 
Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves conclude on Obama’s healthcare policy, “Party 




 The troubles continued, however, when members of the Republican party whom 
found the individual mandate element of bill unconstitutional, challenged its legality 
before the Supreme Court. After a long drawn out battle, Obamacare was narrowly 
deemed constitutional, thus seemingly putting a rest to any controversy that had been 
raised for the bill. In 2013, the online portal of open enrollment for registering for health 
insurance was unveiled, but featured a major setback as the website refused to work 
properly. As Noah C. Rothman says, “Healthcare.gov, the website created to allow 
Americans to shop for different health-care plans, crashed the instant it opened. Even 
those predisposed to pardon Obamacare found it necessary to express some exasperation 
at the inability of consumers to navigate the website,”
142
. Interestingly, it was at this point 
in the whole Obamacare journey where the media relationship which had thus far been in 
Obama’s favor, began to take a mixed approach to his policies. 
The Media and Obamacare 





Douglas L. Kriner and Andrew Reeves, “Responsive Partisanship: Public Support for the Clinton and 
Obama Health Care Plans”, http://jhppl.dukejournals.org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/content/39/4/717 
 
142
Noah C. Rothman, “A Brief History of the ObamaCare Disaster”, Commentary Magazine, 1 January 
2014, accessed October 10, 2014, http://www.commentarymagazine.com/article/a-brief-history-of-the-




 A general theory proposed by Edwards and Wood during the Clinton era states 
that, “In domestic policy, we find a more interactive relationship, one that appears to 
offer the President more opportunity for influencing agendas. On two of the three issues, 
education and health care, the president affects media attention in some instances…we 
find evidence that the president can act in an entrepreneurial fashion to focus the attention 
of others in the system. If an issue is not already part of ongoing media coverage…then 
the president may be able to set the agenda of the networks…,”
143
. I find this theory, 
under the Obama administration, to be true, but perhaps not in the manner that one would 
expect. A surface reading of this theory implies that under the area of domestic policy, a 
President is able to fulfill smoothly the tenets of his agenda because of his strong belief in 
it, and because of that influence and consistent attention drawn to particular policy items, 
the media tends to be focused on those areas specifically, thus building up pressure in 
places such as the legislature to move it through as a coalition with the President. The 
reason that this theory may not be hundred percent accurate is that although Obamacare 
was a domestic policy that was completely President Obama’s brainchild which he was 
able to get passed through the legislature through party support and negotiation , the 
constitutional and implementational challenges that he faced afterwards (which are as 
important when gauging success) and the media circus that ensued due to that failure, 
somewhat hampered the impact of the law.  
The panic that ensued after Obamacare’s rollout was revealed and how that 
affected thousands and their perceptions of the law was due to the media going into a 
confused tizzy. It was during this period that President Obama was not able to maintain 
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the same enthusiastic image he had created for himself and his policies during his 
campaigning days, and instead faced a media effort which, possibly inadvertently, 
undermined his image as an effective leader. 
In his analysis of the media reaction to the obstructions in Obamacare, author 
James Bowman states,  
“The bad news was of course the fiasco of Obamacare, though that didn't seem 
too bad so long as you could persuade yourself, as the media generally did, that it 
was just a matter of a temporarily buggy web site and not a permanently 
unworkable system… The media coverage generally followed the pattern laid out 
by the Times in concentrating on the web site's problems -- which stood a better 
chance of being "fixed" than the Affordable Care Act itself -- as a way of ignoring 
the much larger problems of trust ("If you like your plan you can keep it"), cost 
(the pretense of greater "affordability" of newer policies by comparison with older 
ones was quietly dropped on the grounds that the old, cheaper ones were 
worthless anyway), and the more general unpopularity arising out of the fact that 
people were being forced to buy coverage they didn't want or need. Meanwhile, 
the President embarked on a public relations blitzkrieg in which he attempted to 
obscure the same public dissatisfactions by linking the Affordable Care Act to 
other administration desiderata, including raising the minimum wage and 
redistributing income, which the health care law was implicitly acknowledged to 
have as one of its purposes,”
144
. 
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As a result of augmenting media focus on the flaws of Obamacare, the President was 
forced to take action and quell any concerns that were arising out of that proliferation of 
negative news
145
. The strategy Obama adopted, however, was not rooted in addressing 
the concerns, but rather on other challenges in the nation which needed addressing
146
. By 
doing this, Obama made a mistake that Goodwin discussed earlier
147
. He did not face the 
criticism being offered to him, and instead chose to avoid issue with the confidence that 
ultimately his display of power was above the power of the media and he took that 
relationship for granted. This also implies, however, that the media was not solely anti-
Obama during this time. Similarly, as mentioned in the earlier section with the analysis 
by Goodwin
148
, author James Bowman makes the point that, “The media's willingness to 
come to Mr. Obama's aid in this public relations offensive may have been due to more 
than just their habitual championing of him and his administration,”
149
. The implication 
in this statement echoes the earlier argument that the media is as much to blame for the 
outpouring of negativity against Obamacare as the flaws in the policy itself. Because the 
media supported President Obama in his strategy of diversion from the policy’s concerns, 
the media helped erode the legitimacy of the President by encouraging an activity in 
contrast to his duties. In other words, since concerns with Obamacare existed, the 
President should have connected with the public with the help of the media and provided 
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an immediate picture of what the problems are and what can be done to fix them. He 
eventually did, but only after a period of controversy hit first. The President, thus, hurt 
his own transparency doctrine and due to the mixed proceedings by the media, harmed 
the implementation and effectiveness of his own important policy. Half of the battle is 
passing the legislation and then proving that it was the best course for the nation, and the 
President hurt public confidence with the upheavals that came with the latter, exacerbated 
by the media, whether they were with him or not. It is here that we see a shining example 
of how the media can hurt the policy process as well. 
Obama vs. FDR – A Brief Look At What Obama Did Wrong and FDR Did Right 
 Obama’s relationship with the press media and public/social media both had 
distinct outcomes. Obama was correct in his usage of social media to engage his voters 
and communicate with them about their concerns, fears, and his own policy ideas. By 
doing so, people could recognize that Obama was not only someone who wanted to make 
a personal connection with them, but also provide them with the information that they 
wanted. His Open Government Initiative was proof of the aforementioned ideas because 
that initiative would serve both of these purposes. However, it was his handling of the 
relationship with the press media where he made strategic mistakes. As the media has 
been defined as being one of the most crucial elements when setting a political agenda 
and bringing it success
150
, Obama should have recognized that listening to the arguments 
of the media could only serve to help explain and inform him as to what he could do to 
improve his policies. He should have paid heed to the concerns that they were stating, 
because ultimately the public gains their knowledge through them and if they see that 
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deficiencies exist within a certain policy framework, that public loses faith in that 
candidate and possible party. Obama should have considered the ramifications of this 
before he developed a tough nature with the press during his first campaign and 
subsequently into the later side of his term. The disconnect that Obama so very wanted to 
avoid is ultimately only heightened by the distance between him and the media because if 
the latter provides another window to the President on public concerns and he avoids it, 
he essentially is ignoring the tenets of his own doctrine. Additionally, Obama should 
have been more careful in his alliance with certain media over another. As Goodwin 
argues that some media were yes men and not neutral
151
, Obama fell into a trap of 
carrying out some policies which proved controversial and harmed his image in the 
public eye. As a key component of helping build the Presidential image, the media had to 
and still has to be dealt with in a manner where its portrayal is balanced and where the 
voices of the people manifest themselves honestly to the President. Obama faced a 
setback in his term as President as a result of that imbalance. Thus Obama understood the 
theory of media importance by John Kingdon
152
, but should have been more neutral with 
it within his administration as at some level, the ideas of heeding criticism from the 
media and truly understanding public opinion to find solutions to problems were lost in 
translation in an either extremely adversarial or collaborative relationship. 
 Going back to FDR, I reiterate that he was successful because he fulfilled all 
aspects of Kingdon’s media importance theory
153
. As stated earlier, his use of “Fireside 
Chats”, and the strategy behind them as a source of propaganda was what contributed to 
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his popularity and legitimacy as a President. He recognized the need to use the media 
solely to disseminate information from his administration, because that way, people 
would have somewhat of a link with their leader. He also used it as a means to connect 
with and inform another body which he needed for assistance with policy goals, 
Congress, and through its revolutionary implementation, Roosevelt could obtain 
widespread organizational support for his ideas with parties whom he or they did not 
know that there was a mutual interest. Eventually, as discussed earlier, Roosevelt’s call 
for war through this medium was ratified.  
 In my eyes, the success or failure of this relationship comes down to ensuring a 
definite partnership, whilst maintaining the power and integrity of the Presidency through 
cementing Presidential legitimacy with successful policy passage and implementation.  
Conclusion – What Does All Of This Reveal? 
 Based on the information discussed, the relationship between the media and 
Presidency is complicated. It cannot be avoided that the media provides information to 
the public and President, brings attention to important elements, and creates a viewpoint 
on particular people and happenings. Looking at FDR and Obama, the key to success for 
a President is maintaining a cordial, balanced, but firm relationship with the media so as 
to keep in touch with public opinion so that policies reflect the concerns of the people, 
which in turn enhances the image and legitimacy of the President. The circumstances 
which call for such a partnership are rooted typically in times of crisis, election, and 
when policies are a strong/urgent element in an agenda. It is difficult to give a clear label 
to the media/President relationship, except that it varies from circumstance to 
circumstance and administration to administration. However, Light’s theory that media is 
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only a peripheral element is false. Based on the impact it had in both FDR and Obama’s 
administrations, it clearly served as a means which either helped or hindered policy 
success and implementation through the establishment of a certain perception. FDR was 
able to effectively build an engagement with the nation and members of Congress by 
channeling the existing sentiments and frustrations the public felt at the time of his 
assuming office. That engagement and cordial relationship is what established his 
legitimacy and gave the public a source of direct information, one of the most important 
functions of the media, which Roosevelt recognized. Obama recognized the importance 
of the media too but he marred that interaction by selectively interacting with media that 
was only in accordance with his views. It is because of this critical dichotomy that helped 
Obamacare get negative press and led many in the nation to question the success of that 
policy. Had Obama engage more with the media and used them as a stronger resource to 
connect with the public and lawmakers more about the benefits of his policies, the 
effectiveness of his policy would have been more at the forefront and he would have 
better been recognized as legitimate because of it. My hypothesis that the fruitfulness of 
the relationship between the media and the President is a product of mutual benefits 
obtained by both parties is held true by the discrepancy between Roosevelt and Obama. 
Roosevelt liaised with the media to give the public information, whereas the media saw 
the Presidential speeches as a new form of information dissemination. Obama, as outlined 
above, was mixed in this regard. The former worked with the media to success, and the 
latter did not, emphasizing the complex relationship these two parties share and how 
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Chapter 3 - Party Solidarity: The Importance and Relationship of Party Politics and 
the Presidency 
Although interest groups and the media have been important instruments in the 
functioning of the office of the President and the execution of his agenda, there is a third 
inextricable factor which is arguably as significant in terms of its impact on the 
Commander-In-Chief – the political party. It has been seen time and again, and especially 
in the current political climate, that partisanship has been a crucial determinant in the 
success or failure of a Presidential agenda. As Barack Obama stated in his 2006 book 
“The Audacity of Hope”, that upon his swearing in as a Senator, “The country was 
divided, and so Washington was divided, more divided politically than at any time since 
before World War II...It is such...stark partisanship that has turned Americans off of 
politics,”
154
. In terms of institutional dynamics, it is important to note that the President is 
the manager of the nation. His responsibilities lie in ensuring that every wheel that is 
turning the nation is moving and that the plans that need to be implemented for a 
smoother journey are provided by him. However, the power of the President is bound till 
here, as he is technically an individual who simply has the ideas but cannot personally 
ensure the implementation of them. It is ultimately Congress which formulates and passes 
policies that may or may not be in accordance with the Presidential agenda, and this often 
can leave the President in a strategic quandary. On the one hand, although the President 
has the power to veto, too much usage of it runs the risk of making his leadership seem 
less legitimate as he paves the way to be branded as a “roadblocker” on policy and averse 
to compromise. Similarly, the heightened usage of the veto power can also contribute to 
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the decline in power of that President's particular political party, as the public even begins 
to view them unfavorably due to the President being the ultimate face of what that party 
stands for.   
 As the President is responsible for determining an agenda and leaving it up to 
Congress to take action to implement those policy items legislatively, the constitution of 
the power of his party at that given point of time is prudent. As author Paul Light states, 
“Party support is the chief ingredient in presidential capital; it is the “gold standard” of 
congressional support,”
155
. Keeping in mind the point by Light that having the strong 
backing of the party in Congress is key to the success of the Presidential agenda, it is 
important to examine how the relationship between political parties and the President 
have panned out and what that has meant for that administration. Specifically, it is 
important to ask, to what extent is it true that partisanship has worked for or against the 
perception of particular President? Is that leader looked upon as a success? Are there any 
instances of divided government where a President is still considered to be effective 
despite political disagreements? If so, why is that the case? I theorize that whereas 
interest groups and the media act as external factors which can influence the President, 
the party is an internal binder which is driven solely by the desire to achieve goals in line 
with its ideology, which often translates to the President. Eventually, it is the tactical 
precision during times of divided government which can lead the President to political 
success, as opposed to compromise. For the purposes of this study, I will examine policy 
making under the Reagan and Bush administrations which hold strong traces of divided 
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government and the “party” will be defined in terms of only Democrats and Republicans 
among the President and Congress.  
Why Is Party Politics An Important Factor To Examine – Some Viewpoints 
 Theoretically, the key thing to remember about the relationship between the 
Presidency and the party is the fact that the President can use a party as a means of 
political capital, as mentioned by Light earlier
156
. There is nothing more important to a 
President, as discussed in earlier chapters, than to be viewed as legitimate, and that 
legitimacy only comes when a President is viewed as effective in the eyes of the public. 
The public views the President as effective when he achieves success in his policy 
agenda. Interest groups and the media can be sources of good political capital as the 
coalition that a President builds with them can lead to significant results, as we have 
explored, through lobbying and dissemination of information. But those are external 
sources, and ultimately it is the personal bond that a President can forge with people both 
in his party and the opposing party which leads to policy passage and implementation in 
Congress. From that angle, Light’s theory of party support and it being a “gold standard” 
is significant.  In essence, a significant motivation for the President to heed party interests 
and formulate an agenda along party lines, aside from ensuring his own beliefs, is that it 
gives him another weapon through which he can lobby for his agenda. The reason such a 
weapon is particularly important is in the case of divided government, when either the 
President or Congress are different parties, or when Congress’ two houses themselves are 
divided into two parties. Under those circumstances, the President needs to have a cordial 
relationship with the legislature otherwise he faces Congressional gridlock at nearly 





every turn. Barack Obama outlines in summary what it could turn out to be like for a 
President who has to face divided government as he states, “As a member of the majority, 
you will have some input in any bill that's important to you before it hits the floor. You 
can ask the committee chairman to include language that helps your constituents or 
eliminate language that hurts them. You can even ask the majority leader or the chief 
sponsor to hold the bill until a compromise more to your liking is reached. If you are in 
the minority party, you have no such protection. You must vote yes or no on whatever 
bill comes up, with the knowledge that it's unlikely to be a compromise that either you or 
your supporters consider fair or just,”
157
.  
Paul Light takes his analysis about the importance of party one step further by 
stating, “Presidents and staffs tend to view party support as critical in the day-to-day 
conduct of domestic affairs...in the closed world of Washington politics, the party comes 
into play virtually every day of the term. Party support thereby becomes the central 
component of the President's capital,”
158
. Based on this analysis, the importance of party 
relationships and understanding between the President and Congress is one 
acknowledged by not only the President, but the entire White House political staff, 
because they understand that it is only through building a connection with parties that a 
President can move his agenda through Congress. Additionally, understanding of party 
platforms, both for his own and the one opposing him, enables a President to better 
initiate strategy that can help agenda items which may be in danger due to conflicting 
viewpoints. Light further states, “In measuring potential legislative support, Presidents 
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inevitable must return to the congressional parties. Though party seats do not guarantee 
automatic support, they are the primary basis for influence…Members of Congress work 
with the President because it is to their mutual advantage,”
159
. This adds to another 
motivation to the why the President must tread a careful but unavoidable line when trying 
to balance party politics with Congress. It is as mutually beneficial as working with 
interests groups and the media because it ensures the fulfillment of various ideologies 
which cement not only party standing and affiliation, but legitimacy of power as well. 
When that connection fails, partisanship reigns supreme and stifles progress, undermining 
the legitimacy of the President.  
In his book Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies author John Kingdon 
outlines the basic structure and significance of parties in the realm of politics. He states, 
“Political parties might affect policy agendas through the content of their platforms, the 
impact of their leadership in Congress and more generally in the country the claim they 
might have on their adherents, and the ideologies they represent. Much as in the case of 
campaign promises, a party platform might form the core of an agenda for a subsequent 
administration of that party,”
160
. According to Kingdon, the importance of parties lies in 
the fact that they not only can influence policy agendas, but also that their constitution of 
government at a given point in time can alter the direction policy can take during a 
particular administration
161
. It can be derived from Kingdon's analysis, that agendas are 
driven by the importance they hold within the ideological sphere of a political party, thus 
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pushing a President to develop initiatives that are not based solely on actions that need to 
be taken for the betterment of the nation, but also how those actions fit in within the goals 
of his party at large. As the holder of the nation's largest office, and thus the most 
significant face of the party, the President faces a responsibility of trying to balance 
sometimes dueling interests. It is this battle that eventually creates the biggest problem a 
President faces when dealing with one branch of Congress or full Congress with a party 
that is not his own.  
Another point that was outlined in the previous chapter that contributes to 
Presidential coalition building pertains to that of being elected again, which is always a 
sign of victory for a party and its agenda. This sentiment is best echoed by author 
Constantine J. Spiliotes who states on Presidential decision making and the role of 
partisanship in it, “I argue that…interaction produces an institutionally generated 
incentive for responsible decision making, which often occurs at precisely the moment 
that one would expect a President to focus on exogenously generated incentives for 
decision making, such as reelection or legislative consensus with core partisans in 
Congress,”
162
. In summary, according to this theory, it is actually a President’s 
underlying desire to keep his party in power and be reelected which is the motivation 
behind his strong drive to move policy along in Congress to success and build a coalition 
with its players. 
  Despite the importance given to party support, legitimacy, and coalition building, 
it is obvious that many Presidents have taken party support to an extreme and have 
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watered down the importance of coalition building. They have developed a perception 
that not working together, but rather aggressively pushing for policies that satisfy only 
the core base of their own political parties is the one way to remain significant in the eyes 
of the public. In fact, extreme partisan behavior can be described as the backbone of the 
modern Presidency. Barack Obama echoes these concerns stated as to what the 
partisanship can do to the functioning of a government. He writes, “...what's troubling is 
the gap between the magnitude of our challenges and the smallness of our politics-the 
ease with which we are distracted by the petty and trivial, our avoidance of tough 
decisions, our seeming inability to build a working consensus to tackle any big 
problem,”
163
. It is this concern for gridlock which should essentially drive and serve as a 
motivation to a President to ensure that his policy agenda is moving along in Congress. It 
is important to note, however, that strong partisanship was not something that has been 
the hallmark of a Presidency since the beginning of our nation. This is something that has 
come to evolve (to be discussed later). In fact, in terms of the evolution, author Richard 
M. Skinner defines what the Presidency looked like historically, “Through an "objective" 
media, presidents appeal directly to voters, over the heads of party leaders, seeking a 
nonpartisan image. They build ad hoc coalitions of support in Congress without regard to 
party lines. They preside over an executive branch staffed by nonpartisan experts more 
interested in policy than politics. Presidents show little interest in their party's 
performance in down-ballot races, let alone its long-term fate. All of these propositions 
held true for presidents of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, especially Dwight Eisenhower, 
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Lyndon B. Johnson, and Jimmy Carter,”
164
. In essence, the ability of a President to work 
together, be balanced, and work with nonpartisan coalitions has slowly diminished which 
may or may not be a cause for concern. It must also be noted that Skinner further writes 
that this shift in ideology came under Reagan era, as he states, “Beginning with Ronald 
Reagan, recent presidents have increasingly relied upon their parties for support both in 
the electorate and in the Congress. They have presented a more distinctively partisan 
image to voters and have found it difficult to cultivate support from the opposition. They 
have sought to lead their parties, using the national committees to garner support for their 




The common element to take away from all of these theories is that there is 
unanimous recognition that parties are an important part of the function of the office of 
the President, especially when it comes to fulfilling an agenda. Like the media and 
interest groups, it can be mutually beneficial for a leader to work with members of his 
party and others to achieve legislative goals which get a particular job done and satisfy 
the ideology of the both parties. This satisfaction makes not only both parties look good, 
but also legitimizes the role of the President as a bridge builder to successful policy 
initiatives for the country. In other words, Presidents need to be able to appeal to both 
their own party and that of their opposition to ensure a smooth implementation of their 
agenda. They need to establish coalitions which cover both sides of the aisle, and reach 
solutions which are moderate in nature. That is the only way in which the American 
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government can function, otherwise too extreme ideologies result in gridlock. However, 
as stated, there has also been a recognizable shift in the way politics plays out today 
between branches. Based on that shift, the study of how partisanship has played out in 
different divided administrations becomes all the more significant because it is important 
to identify whether this shift has had a negative or positive impact on the modern 
Presidency. 
A Note on the Reagan Administration 
 According to Skinner, the historical root of the partisanship that exists in the 




“… Ronald Reagan defined the partisan presidency as surely as Franklin 
Roosevelt did the Modern Presidency. In an era when many look back to the 
1980s as a less divisive time, we must remember what a polarizing figure Reagan 
himself was in his times. He sought to remake the Republican Party in his 
conservative image and to vault it into majority status; in this mission, he 
repeatedly campaigned for Republican candidates. He used the Republican 
National Committee to win support for his programs, and he worked closely with 
Republican leaders in Congress…Reagan polarized the electorate more than any 
of his predecessors, even Richard Nixon. Through centralization of policy 
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decisions and appointment of ideological loyalists, Reagan managed to make the 
executive branch a tool of conservative governance,”
167
. 
Based on this summary of Reagan’s administration by Skinner, Reagan managed to 
counter everything that previous Presidents had built up, when it comes to coalition 
building with Congress. As stated in chapter 1
168
, Reagan was driven by a desire to 
establish a strong conservative base to institute his policies, which included restructuring 
the manner in which he ran his staff at the White House. He furthered this, as stated 
above in more specifics, through strong support of his fellow party members through 
campaigns, usage of the national Republican committee, and work solely with 
Republican members of Congress on legislation and political structuring in major offices. 
Another action attributed to Reagan during this time that was indicative of his strong 
partisan nature was the usage of signing statements which was, “…a White House 
strategy, begun in 1985, of using presidential "signing statements" to quietly but 
consistently expand presidential power. Statements issued as the president signed 
congressional legislation were now more deliberately crafted to put on the public record 
the president's rationale for interpreting or even ignoring particular provisions in the law 
he was signing,”
169
.This was widely considered to be a radical action by Reagan as, 
“Reagan also passed on a presidency that was more dangerous for our constitutional 
order, although I am sure that was never his intention. Behind the scenes, Reagan's tenure 
in the White House gave a sharpened impetus to the idea of presidential 
                                                          
167
Skinner, “George W. Bush and the Partisan Presidency”, 608 
 
168
See Thesis Chapter 1, section Interest Groups and the Reagan Administration, 12-16 
 
169
Hugh Heclo, “The Mixed Legacies of Ronald Reagan”, Presidential Studies Quarterly,Vol 38, No.4, 






. Thus, Reagan was perceived as someone putting forth a dangerous 
precedent as a result of his strong partisan leanings, which translated to a variety of 
means of pursuing his policies in that way.  
Scholar Paul Kengor also further defines the motivation behind Reagan’s heavy 
partisan approach to government by stating, “Stephen Skowronek argues that both 
Reagan and FDR were partly thrust to success due to the failures of their immediate 
predecessors. He complements both men as "reconstructive leaders,”
171
. Of Reagan, he 
writes, "Devastatingly simple and viscerally seductive, Reagan's reconstructive posture 
quickly earned him distinction as a 'Great Communicator,' the most masterful politician 
in the presidency since Franklin Roosevelt,”
172
. It is important to note that despite 
partisanship being a hallmark of Reagan’s presidency, he was still perceived to be a 
leader who was ultimately successful. The reason, Kengo argues that Reagan was so 
successful as a leader was because,  
“Reagan was renowned for his charm and likableness… Reagan's approval 
ratings, with the exception of the 1982-83 recession, were well above average, 
hitting 66 percent in early 1985 and remaining near that level up to the Iran-
Contra fiasco. Despite Iran-Contra, he left office with Gallup Poll approval ratings 
above 60 per cent. Those numbers were highest for any president in the postwar 
era with the exception of Ike, who also exited with a rating above 60 percent…
173
.  
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Based on this idea, Reagan used not only party politics to advance his agenda, but also 
translated that strategically to reflect himself as a voice of change for the people. His 
“charm” was put to more usage because Reagan realized that simply strong party politics 
would not be enough to fulfill an agenda. He would need to channel the sentiments of the 
public, whom had been through a few frustrating administration, and really establish the 
connectivity necessary to make his policies and his party look good. The result of this 
was a successful perception of his leadership, which is best summarized by Hugh Heclo, 
who states,   
“After two terms, Reagan left behind a presidency that was robust and widely 
admired…it is widely held that successful presidents lead through exercising their 
power to persuade. They combine an active, transformative agenda and a positive, 
uplifting attitude… He brought dignity, confidence, and moral conviction to the 
office. The vision he communicated helped restore America's confidence in 
itself… President Reagan was successful in the sense of effectively putting his 
imprint on executive branch operations. This occurred in the first instance by 
Reagan's being clear on the principles through which he intended to govern. 
…This effect of bringing the executive branch into line with presidential 
preferences was bolstered by more centralized White House control over 
departmental political appointments, budgets and legislative proposals, judicial 
appointments, federal regulations, and executive orders,”
174
. 
The important thing to note about these analyses is that Reagan’s success came from an 
antithesis to the common theoretical order. The common belief that strong coalition 
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building and solidarity is key to policy success was rendered moot by Reagan. Instead, he 
stuck solely to the idea of partisan support to advance his goals. His belief in his own 
power as the President and belief in the power of his own party is what enabled him to 
move successfully forward, at the expense of constitutional concerns. In fact during this 
time, Reagan’s policies were viewed as so successful, that support for liberals faced a 
massive decline in support for their policies.
175
. Ultimately, even though the ethics of this 
strategy were questionable, and some may argue Reagan as a pragmatic, Reagan was still 
able to legitimize himself in the eyes of the public through his assertive disposition. At a 
time, which was “…after a string of Presidential failures following Kennedy’s 
murder…”
176
, Reagan’s ability to get things done is what counted. The people were 
starved for a leader whom would take risks and be strong. Thus, Reagan is an example of 
how strong partisanship could work, as long as circumstances and public identification 
with a leader mix to produce results that define legitimacy. 
A Note On The Bush Administration 
I start this section with a statement which sets the tone of what party politics was 
like during the course of the Bush administration. Author Richard M. Skinner states, “But 
since 1980, we have seen the rise of a new kind of presidency-a partisan presidency. And 
George W. Bush has brought this partisanship to a new extreme-perhaps to the point 
when practice becomes pathology,”
177
. Barack Obama describes an apt story about Karl 
Rove, an important advisor to President Bush,  from that time which is representative of 
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how party support as a source of political capital can be an effective way to fulfilling an 
agenda item along. He writes,  
“In its first term, at least, the Bush White House was a master of such legislative 
gamesmanship. There's an instructive story about the negotiations surrounding the 
first round of Bush tax cuts, when Karl Rove invited a Democratic senator's 
potential support for the President's package. Bush had won the senator's state 
handily in the previous election-in part on a platform of tax cuts-and the senator 
was generally supportive of lower marginal rates. Still, he was troubled by the 
degree which the proposed tax cuts were skewed towards the wealthy and 
suggested a few changes that would moderate the package's impact,”
178
.  
Obama then goes on to describe how the Senator told Rove that he would support the bill 
only if certain amendments were includes, which would guarantee a supermajority of 
Democratic votes
179
. This proposal was countered by Rove who stated that he simply 
wanted “fifty one” votes, which would be just enough to fulfill the political needs of the 
Bush administration, while at the same time maintaining the strong partisan divide 
already at play
180




 Based on the story by Obama, this is yet another example of how party politics 
and partisanship need not be considered a hindrance, when it comes to looking at the 
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effectiveness it plays in the Presidential agenda. Here we saw how Bush used a strategy 
of party détente to influence Congressional decision making. Through Karl Rove, he 
proved that what was important was simply getting a particular agenda item done, at the 
expense of building bipartisan relations in Congress. But what was it that really drove 
Bush to take such a firm approach and establish himself as such a partisan leader? The 
answer lies in the fact that Bush, “…has been intensely unpopular with Democrats. Now 
that his support among independents has fallen to barely more than one in four, Bush is 
forced to rely almost exclusively on his GOP base,”
182
. Based on this quote, what drove 
Bush to adopt this strategy of strong party support came from the fact that his legitimacy 
as a bipartisan began to severely wane and he needed to find a way to counter and build 
upon the negative perception the Democratic party had of him, of which the only way 
was through aggressive quelling of Democratic opposition.  
Ultimately, some also argue, that the extent to which Bush’s policies began to be 
effective with his partisan strategy were quite low. James M. McCormick, Eugene R. 
Wittkopf, and David M. Danna write, “Bush gained bipartisan support on 19 percent of 
the foreign policy votes in the House and 29 percent in the Senate, while Clinton enjoyed 
bipartisan support on 27 percent in the House and 32 percent in the Senate. Further, 
Bush's bipartisan support in both chambers was lower than that of the other post- 
Vietnam administrations (Ford, Carter, and Reagan),”
183
. This is not to say, however, that 
Bush’s strong roots in his party politics were still not impactful. It is stated that, “During 
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the Bush administration, party and ideology are statistically significant in both the House 
and the Senate, but the relative impact of ideology is greater,”
184
. 
 Another example of how Bush employed party politics in his administration is 
delineated by Skinner. Skinner writes,  
“In late 2002, the Bush White House, dissatisfied with Trent Lott's leadership and 
dismayed by the uproar over the senator's remarks at Strom Thurmond's 100th 
birthday party, helped engineer his removal as Senate Republican 
Leader…George W. Bush has been able to rely on a solid phalanx of Senate 
Republicans to block Democratic proposals, especially any effort to restrain his 
hand in Iraq… …Both presidents selected ideologically sympathetic subordinates, 
centralized policy and personnel decisions in the White House, and used the OMB 
to curb regulatory excess. ..The Reagan and George W. Bush administrations also 
sought to secure greater partisan/ideological control of the judiciary… 




Based on this explanation by Skinner, similar to Reagan, Bush employed a few tactics to 
establish his power during his administration, via sticking to his party. He filled offices 
with appointees that fulfilled his political goals, and pursued policies that were staunchly 
linked to his party.  
Although Bush decided to work closely with members of his party, a question that 
must be considered is, what was the overall reaction to Bush’s partisanship? Was his 
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strategy ultimately successful in the long run? This question is highly debatable. Author 
Gary Jacobson argues, “…every administration  inevitable shapes public perceptions 
about who and what the president’s party stands for and how well it governs when in 
office. All of this is arguably even truer of George W. Bush than of any recent 
predecessor. With few exceptions, his administration pursued a partisan agenda using 
partisan tactics while receiving extraordinarily high levels of support from Republican 
leaders in Congress and elsewhere… congressional Republicans remained largely 
supportive, if only because their own core Republican constituents continued to give the 
president high approval ratings ( Jacobson 2008),”
186
. According to Jacobson’s analysis, 
although Bush was highly partisan during his administration, he was able to maintain his 
legitimacy as a leader because he was able to unify his party and the wide conservative 
base. Bush’s ability to bring about party organization and solidarity, despite policies 
whose merits were strongly debated, indicates that one yardstick for measuring the 
success of a President’s reputation is through the appeal he has to the group that supports 
him in the first place. The implication here is that where some theorists argue that leaders 
must be more balanced in their approach to policy, the ability of a President to represent a 
strong face to his party is also undeniable to his legitimacy
187
. Bush displayed some 
levels of success as a leader due to his party politics. 
It is also not so simplistic that simply Bush’s strong relationship with his party 
lead to certain successes. As with Reagan, Bush’s effectiveness as a leader has been 
characterized by the circumstances that have surrounded his leadership. Jacobson states 
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that, “The terrorist attacks of 9/11, and Bush’s forceful response to them, provoked the 
greatest rally in public support ever observed for a President…,”
188
 and then ultimately 
when Bush began his war on terror in the Middle East, this period started off high and 
then nosedived lower and lower
189
. The fact that the public supported Bush’s “forceful 
response” to 9/11, indicates that although Bush may be acting in line with his party’s 
wishes, the patriotic sentiment that came during that time also helped Bush’s actions gain 
support from his party and across the aisle. Eventually, when that sentiment tapered and 
perceptions mounted about the effectiveness about the war on terror, the public divided. 
The main element to consider here is that Bush’s partisan behavior was not the, or only, 
factor in the eventual implementation of the war on terror. It was the advent of political 
circumstances, which Bush was pragmatically able to channel, that drove the initial 
support for his wartime actions.  
Like Reagan, party politics played an important role in this administration. 
Although Bush’s policies have been viewed with mixed results, his usage of strong party 
based liaisons and policies enhanced his overall image during different periods of his 
administration, which led to success for some of them and a strong look of legitimacy at 
his leadership.  
Conclusion 
Based on these findings, party politics and ideology have had a huge impact on 
the Presidential agenda because of the different results they provide on Presidential 
policymaking. Whereas theorists argue that Presidents must engage strongly with both 
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parties, listen to policy developments on both sides, and use that interaction to formulate 
neutral policy for success, the examples of Reagan and Bush show some of both. Reagan 
proved that through assertive determination and capitalization of public disorientation 
with a previous regime, policies can be successful. Reagan instituted a more closed 
government where the conservative ideology was given stronger preference than that of 
the liberal, and he used that division pragmatically to play up his policies. The public 
supported him because of that confidence and because of the circumstances of his 
election. It is an example like this which shows that a leader need not be so extremely 
engaged with the opposing party to be, or at least be viewed as, a success. This counters 
many of the theories discussed in this chapter. Bush, on the other, hand also employed 
partisanship but did so with mixed results. He behaved more pragmatically because he 
realized that his opposition will remain strong, and he applied pressure through resources 
like Karl Rove, to assert that dominance in Congress. However, his tactics met with 
mixed success and he eventually proved some of the theories proposed about 
collaboration to be true. Based on this analysis, the relationship between party politics 
and the Presidency is strong and complex as it drives the leader to behave a certain 
strategic way when promoting his agenda, though this motivation does not always 
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 The overarching driving force for a President is successful implementation of his 
policy agenda, which legitimizes his role as a leader of his party and of the nation. 
However, the manner in which a President achieves these policy goals and maintains his 
legitimacy are complex. This complexity is the result of a myriad of interactions that he 
has with various entities, each of which help shape and drive his policy agenda in 
different ways. The three of the biggest instruments of a President’s policy agenda have 
been displayed as being interest groups, the media, and party politics. Each of these 
elements have maintained a different type of relationship with each President, where 
either he has visibly been more inclined to encourage coalitions with these groups to 
move his agenda forward, maintained a distance, or has faced roadblocks and adversity 
from working with them or from them.  
With interest groups, Presidents Carter, Ford, Reagan, Clinton, and Obama each 
interacted differently with interest groups for achieving success in policy goals. In the 
analysis of Carter, we saw that Carter used an approach of achieving policy goals where 
his sole goal was success with legislative agenda, not particularly driven strongly by 
partisan interests.  He interacted with interest groups openly and made sure to use them as 
a resource to help move along his policies and act as mediators in a Congress racked by 
gridlock. Although it is debatable in the long run how successful Carter was policy wise, 
with many actually considering his Presidency to be one of mixed results, his drive to 
succeed on his agenda was put into motion by utilizing interest groups as a resource for 
progress. His predecessor, President Ford, had a different concern to tackle. He came into 
office following a difficult and controversial Presidency, and the main concern he had 
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was his reputation as a leader. To legitimize his office, Ford used a method of 
engagement where his alliance with interest groups was driven by a desire to uptick his 
policy success and use them as a means, like Carter, to drive policy goals in Congress. 
Here we saw a President interact with interest groups solely for personal gain, as he 
needed to prove himself as a capable face of the party and policymaker. His success has 
also been debated on the policy front, like Carter, but Ford represented yet another 
example of a President’s leaning on interest groups to drive his policies. Reagan used a 
different approach where he employed strong partisanship in the organization of the 
executive branch. He instituted access to interest groups to primarily those on the same 
page as him, and limited groups, such as minority groups, in his interactions. Some would 
argue that this was a mistake because more interest group interaction expands the wide 
network of resources a leader can use to push policies, and by disengaging, you are 
alienating a group that can be potentially helpful. A counterargument is that this is a form 
of pragmatism, where you do not waste political capital and energy on groups that will 
opposed you anyway. Instead, focus on strengthening those ties which are already strong 
for a more effective force. Clinton was similar to Reagan, some feel, with regard to 
pragmatism because he also engaged only with those that agreed with and often did 
things that were appeasing to groups that he wanted to strengthen ties with, like interest 
groups. Some also argue that Clinton’s tenure was hampered by this practice, such as 
Renshon, as it often made Clinton seem confused as to whom he should try to appease to 
move his policy ideas forward. Clinton, was driven by a desire to be appreciated by all 
parties he engaged in, but sometimes countered that with a perspective to only do what 
fulfills his policy agenda, whether that included working with or alienating many interest 
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groups. Most recently, Obama has displayed a strict relationship with interest groups as 
well. He has instituted and amended existing legislation making the impact of interest 
groups less within the confines of Congress. Most likely subtly driven by a partisan slant, 
since he has to deal with a divided Congress, Obama has taken an action that seeks to 
protect his policy interests by reducing the influence of those strong interest groups 
which can sway both his party and opposing party members to the other side of issues 
that he supports. This may also be looked at as a type of pragmatism like Carter, where 
he is doing what he can to move policy throng a gridlocked Congress, or as a partisan 
move which seeks to make him appear a stronger representative of his party. He too, like 
the predecessors mentioned however, is preoccupied with legitimacy and uses a means of 
controlled interaction to keep involved with interest groups while not giving them too 
much power in policymaking. 
With interest groups, leaders act based on circumstances, image related goals, and 
policy goals. The President has been shown to create coalitions with interest groups to 
fulfill his agenda only when absolutely necessary. The common driving factor between 
all is the element of gain that one derives from working with interest groups to move 
policy goals along. A variety of approaches have defined these relationships, but in recent 
times, administrations have gotten more strict with regard to policy, circumventing this 
relationship. It is important to look at this relationship and its evolution because it puts 
into perspective truly how much Presidents interact with interest groups as an external 
force when moving policy, and how much impact they can have on his idea. This 
understanding creates an awareness that Presidents do not solely take action with the 
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power of their office, but sometimes have to work with and regulate outside forces which 
can have just as much of an impact on policymaking. 
The next instrument of interest, the media, plays both a positive and negative role 
in an administration. If used correctly, it can enhance a leader’s image and even lead his 
policies to success. But if not on his side, the media can hamper the success of a leader. 
When looking Franklin Delano Roosevelt, he used the media successfully as a tool to 
promote his policies and engage the nation. He recognized that the key to being a 
legitimate leader, especially in a nation that had lost hope in its government, was to create 
an open and transparent relationship and dialogue with them. His fireside chats proved to 
be revolutionary, and the public’s nationalistic sentiments were enhanced by his ability to 
establish a relationship with them through a form of mass media. By channeling an 
existing emotion in accordance with his own goals and policy ideas, Roosevelt proved 
that the media can be used as an effective tool to influence Congress and the public to 
gather more support. With Obama, the relationship was a lot more bumpy. During his 
campaigns in both 2008 and 2012, Obama identified the partnership and usage of media 
that could help him win. He extensively used social media and created innovative ways to 
engage with the public, using networks like Youtube, Twitter, and Facebook. However, it 
was during his Presidency, primarily, where he established another iron handed approach 
with the media, like he did with interest groups. Although he started his term by 
initializing more open interactions and access to government, Obama became more strict 
when a string of controversies began to mar his leadership. Elements such as where he 
was born to what religion he truly follows, became fodder for the media, which naturally 
was not looked upon favorably by Obama. At first, he patiently admonished the media for 
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their focus on rumors, as opposed to policy initiatives the country needed to achieve. 
However, as time wore on, Obama established a more distant relationship with the media 
by not engaging with them during certain political meetings such as one such one during 
his trip to Asia. This relationship was further fractured when certain elements of the 
media painted a negative picture of his health care policy, which is viewed to be the most 
significant aspect of his legacy as a leader. 
 Obama recognized, however, that he does need the media to relay 
information to the public, and thus did not disregard all of them completely. Common 
criticisms for Obama focus on the fact that he chose to engage with media that supported 
him, while disregarding those elements of media that represented opposing views to his 
own. These actions can be viewed as a pragmatic effort to combat any source of 
information given to the public that undermines his image as a legitimate leader. The 
important thing to take away from the second chapter is that the media has been another 
driver of the effectiveness of the Presidential agenda. That effectiveness comes from a 
view of a Presidential policy as legitimate, and if a driver of the Presidential agenda is 
painting a negative picture of him, he must work together or firmly with that element to 
insure his image is protected and that he is using that element to engage with lawmakers 
and the public, who can keep his support going, something Roosevelt did with his fireside 
chats and which Obama had mixed results with through his strict and controlled 
interactions post assuming office. The media is yet another factor, like interest groups, 




On the party politics side, party affiliation has been found to have led to mixed 
results for success as well. As outlined in the first two chapters, this element is one that is 
a common motivation for leaders no matter whom they are working with. The ultimate 
goal of any leader is to keep his party in stronger power and achieve what the party 
wants. Based on the initiative of a leader, and circumstances, it has been discovered that 
party can affect the legitimacy, perception, and agenda of a leader. One argument is that 
party politics is an internal source of political capital that a leader can use to either move 
only his party’s agenda forward, or engage with rival parties to facilitate a more 
successful policy run. The extent to which a leader does this can affect policy outcomes. 
This is most important in divided government. Another argument is that party politics is 
an important fabric in the day to day policymaking game at the White House, and a 
balanced approach to this, enables a leader to be more informed and tactical when 
moving agenda items along and engaging. When that engagement is not there, a 
President’s legitimacy can be eroded as he can be viewed as someone unwilling to 
compromise. Some leaders fall into a partisan trap, which stifles success. If a leader can 
balance gridlock, the direction of policy is often more smooth.  
We looked at Reagan and Bush as important examples of partisan Presidents. 
Reagan was found to be a successful leader due to his partisan practices because it 
established him as a dedicated and committed leader, who was firm, which counters 
traditional theory on collaboration. Furthermore, Reagan also used existing circumstances 
to his advantage. Bush was less successful in his efforts, but he established partisanship 
as a result of recognizing that his support across the aisle is at such a low anyways that he 
would not garner support there anyway. Depending on the situation, he also used 
96 
 
effective organization to rally support for his policies. Party politics is an important 
element to analyze because it is the most complex of all drivers. Its usage has led to 
success in some administrations, whereas failure in others, and it all comes down to 
public perception of a leader and how he uses that strategically to advance his policy 
goals. 
 To make this study better, more data needed to be research on current 
administrations and more research needed to be found on current administrations. It was a 
large challenge to find specific policy initiatives that fulfill the arguments put forth by the 
theorists in each chapter. I think more study could also have been made on 
administrations that are in the gaps between the discussed regimes to better understand 
how the evolution occurred further.  It was particularly challenging to find scholarly work 
on Obama, since much of what is discussed on him is fairly recent. More detailed 
research on theories with regard to his administration would have been helpful for all 
chapters. 
 In conclusion, the primary objective to do this study is to understand that forces 
outside of Presidential control are in fact as instrumental as his own initiatives to get 
things done. Within those forces, the President interacts with them and liaises with them 
in different ways, based on circumstances, to achieve policy success, which can cement 
his legitimacy. Depending on how he is viewed and what he wants to achieve, the 
President executes actions which engage or disengage these groups. His policies also are 
not clear cut, as some may view them as successful or failure. With interest groups and 
the media, the President has to tread a careful line because he knows that they can be 
wonderful resources, yet at the same time, malign his work through information or false 
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representation. Party politics is a lot more standard and a bigger driver because the 
President is first answerable to those whom have chosen him as the leader of their 
solidarity, and thus serves as the biggest motivation for a President to serve their 
interests. The policymaking process is complex and the inclusion of these drivers in that 
process certainly cements that viewpoint. The contribution these papers have made to this 
study is through the collection and analysis of a variety of viewpoints which reflect 
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